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Abstract
The Internet has affected information flow in copyrighted content in a profound manner. Authors 
and artists are enabled through the Internet to assert greater control over the flow of information in their 
works as these new technologies offer new and different distribution channels for content. These new 
technologies also allow consumers to use content in ways, which had not been anticipated by the copyright 
industries. This paper presents that copyright law was developed for a specific purpose, which was to 
encourage learning and growth. As new technologies emerge and as content industries experience changes 
in information flow in copyrighted works, copyright law had been used to maintain control over existing 
information flows. The law has a pivotal role to play as the industries assert greater control over the flow 
of information in content. The role of copyright law in this instance is not to maintain the existing status 
quo as the industries undergo changes and loss of control over information flow in copyrighted works. 
Rather, the law serves a more fundamental purpose of balancing information flow between private and 
public interests. As the law was designed to encourage authors and artists to produce creative works for 
the public purposes of education, socio-economic and cultural growth, copyright law in the global 
information society plays an even more important role in ensuring that society has access to information in 
copyrighted works.
Introduction
Attempts by the copyright industries to strengthen copyright protection may be 
seen to be an effort to retain control of creative works and resist the freedom of 
consumers to use creative works in new and innovative ways. In an unprecedented 
fashion, consumers of creative works are today enabled through digital technologies as 
well as the networked environment of cyberspace to share, exchange, modify and 
transform an original copyrighted work in a manner, which print and analog technologies 
did not permit before. Computing technologies have shifted the flow of creative 
production and affected the traditional flow of information from the publisher of creative 
content to the consumer. As the flow of information between publisher and consumer 
changes courses to connect consumer to consumer and artists or authors to consumer in a 
way that transcends jurisdictions and national boundaries, the copyright industries face 
deep-rooted challenges in maintaining traditional methods of controlling the uses of 
creative works. The profound changes brought about by enabling technologies present 
difficult challenges to the copyright industries seeking to retain control of creative works 
through an assertion of stronger copyrights because the emergence of an alternative 
distribution channel for creative works through cyberspace empowers artists and authors 
by directly connecting them with the consumers of their works and presenting producers 
of creative works an option of bypassing their publishers. Consumers are also empowered 
by digital technologies to use creative works for the production of other creative works 
through modification and transformative uses, which content publishers are not able to 
control. 
This paper attempts to trace the traditional flow of content between publishers and 
consumers of creative works and identify the changes brought about by digital 
2technologies and the networked environment of cyberspace to the copyright industries. It 
is shown that print and analog technologies have allowed owners of creative works to 
retain control of the flow of information to the consumer because the very nature of print 
and analog technologies permit a consumer of creative works little or minimal 
modification and alteration to creative works. Digital technologies however, present 
opportunities to the consumer to change the flow of information by modifying and 
altering creative works and redistributing those works through the Internet to other 
consumers. This paper presents that digital technologies changes the flow of information 
in creative content toward the consumer and allow the consumer of creative content to 
use creative works in a manner, which previous technologies did not permit. As more 
consumers become empowered by the use of digital technologies, it is envisaged that the 
production of creative works for the progress of science and the useful arts will bring a 
deeper meaning as cultural growth occurs through new and creative uses of existing 
works. The paper proceeds to analyze the manner in which copyright law draws the 
balance between public and private interests to ensure that creative works are available to 
the public for developmental purposes as well as cultural growth and demonstrates how 
digital technologies cultivates cultural growth through the use of creative works for 
transformative purposes. This paper concludes by submitting that the doctrine of fair use 
plays an even more significant role in the digital age to ensure that the proper balance 
between public and private interests is achieved to encourage the production of creative 
works and at the same time protect the constitutional right of access to creative works for 
the progress of science and the useful arts. 
Part 1: The Traditional Flow of Information in the Copyright Industries
For most of copyright law’s history, the law developed and grew around 
technologies, which were built on an analog platform, which allowed content owners to 
control the flow, dissemination and use of information in content. Analog platform 
technologies, while allowing works to be reproduced and distributed to a wide segment of 
the public, nonetheless allowed copyright owners to keep a better grasp on the 
reproduction and distribution of their works “with the relative ease of detecting 
unauthorized commercial-scale publication.”1 Analog technologies did not provide the 
much more “versatile, although more porous, platform for storing, distributing and 
reproducing works of authorship,”2 which digital technologies today provide the content 
industries, offering new opportunities to commercialize creative works and build new 
markets through the Internet and at the same time changing the course of information 
flow between content owner and consumer. Traditionally, print and analog technologies 
had by their very nature vested control of the flow of information with the publisher or 
printer of content. The interests of the author and the consumer of creative works were 
1
 Analog platforms ““fix” works of authorship through some human or mechanical process of deforming a 
physical object (such as stone, paper, vinyl, film) in a manner that conveys an image (a letter, number, or 
graphic image) or signal varying in audio frequency (sound) or light or color intensity (film). The term 
“analog” is used to signify that the medium uses an “analogy” to represent the phenomenon.” Peter S. 
Menell, Can Our Current Conception of Copyright Law Survive the Internet Age?: Envisioning Copyright 
Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 104-105 (2002)
2 See id. at 105
3largely ancillary to the primary interests of copyright owners,3 which were printers and 
publishers, who owned the right to publish a manuscript or a piece of work and recover 
profits from the printing and publishing of creative works. This monopoly over the right 
to publish had effectively allowed printers and publishers in traditional copyright 
industries to control the course of information flow in creative works.      
The initial conception of copyright as a right of a publisher or printer to publish 
literary works4 did not perceive of the right of the author in the work5 nor of the public’s 
right of access to the work. The right to retain control over creative works and as a result, 
the course of information flow from the printer or publisher to the consumer of literary 
works, began as a tool to regulate the conduct of trade within the print industry. 
Copyright, in the form of a publisher’s right to make copies of books,6 began in 16th
century England7 as a loose set of rules that were governed by guild ordinances and acts 
of censorship.8 The right, largely a tool for trade regulation9 had been developed by the 
earliest London publishers as a form of business practice and was granted by the 
publishers’ guild, a medieval association of book publishers known as the Stationers’ 
3
 Copyright, as was originally conceived, did not encompass the rights of authors or users of copyrighted 
works. It is said that the “[r]ight of copy was the stationer’s [the printer or publisher] not the author’s.” 
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 5 (Columbia University Press 1967) 
4 L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT 20 (University of Georgia 
Press 1991)
5
 It is said that “any prevailing notions of piracy or plagiarism” … “would have been viewed with printer’s 
or publisher’s not author’s eyes. And while there was an idea of piracy of content which might reach 
beyond verbatim copying, we should not suppose that any abstruse or refined ideas of literary theft could 
have been entertained. Right of copy was the stationer’s not the author’s. Living authors furnished some of 
the materials for the printing mills, and increasingly these manuscripts had to be purchased in a business 
way (usually payment was made in a lump sum).” See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF 
COPYRIGHT 5 (Columbia University Press 1967). Author’s rights in literary works arose formally in the 
decision of Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303; 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1769), which is said to have “marked the 
great transition of legal thought to analyzing copyright as a right of the author” as the analysis in the case 
focused on whether the author had a property right in literary works arising from the very creation of the 
work. Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of 
Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1153 (1983)  
6
 Prior to the introduction of the printing press in England, publishers together with “scribes, booksellers 
and bookbinders” had already organized themselves within the book trade to form the Stationers’ 
Company, which became a “closely knit, powerful cartel with a single object – maintaining order and 
profits in the publishing trade.” Only members of the Stationers’ Company were entitled to print books. 
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY 41 (Hill and Wang 1994)  
7
 A royal printer was appointed in England in 1504 and the first printing privilege was issued in 1518 to his 
successor Richard Pynson. The first printing privilege was issued “in the form of a prohibition for two 
years of the printing by any other person of a certain speech to which this first English copyright notice was 
appended.” It is also stated that “Bishop Fell, in his memoirs on the state of printing in the University of 
Oxford, states that this University had been granted certain exclusive privileges of transcribing and 
multiplying books by means of writing; and Lowndes in his early “Historical sketch of the law of 
copyright,” published in 1840 and 1842, cites many early privileges, most commonly for seven years, 
granted after the invention of printing.” RICHARD ROGERS BOWKER, COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORY AND LAW 19 
(Houghton Mifflin Company 1912) 
8
 The “stationer’s copyright” it is said, “existed for over a hundred and fifty years regulated not only by the 
common-law, but by guild ordinances and acts of censorship.” LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 9 (Vanderbilt University Press 1968) 
9 See id. at 11
4Company.10 Primarily being a right to publish a work and nothing more,11 the right was 
one that belonged to the London book publishers, which were members of the Stationers’ 
Company, and any disputes about copyright ownership were resolved within the 
governing body of the Stationers’ Company known as the Court of Assistance.12 As 
copyright was introduced as a way to conduct the early book publishing business in 
London, copyright as it was conceived then is said to not have any theoretical 
justification or jurisprudential basis.13
The introduction of a new technology, the printing press, however, resulted in the 
formalization of copyright into a formal set of rules to protect literary works. Most 
academic literature earmark the introduction of the printing press as the impetus for 
formalizing copyright into an established set of rules14 because the technology provided 
the “first realistic opportunity for authors to recognize the potential economic benefit 
from their work.”15  Copyright and technological developments are inextricably 
entwined. The development of a new technology in the form of the printing presses that 
allowed the making of copies of literary works resulted in the emergence of copyright as 
a tool for controlling the production of creative works.16 The Supreme Court recognized 
this dynamic relationship between the law and technology in Sony Corp. of America v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc.17 when the Court commented that “from its beginning the 
law of copyright has developed as a response to significant changes in technology. 
Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copying equipment – the printing press –
that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection.”18 When copies of literary 
works were made by hand writing a manuscript all over again before the introduction of 
10
 The rights assumed by the Stationers’ Company “were not copyrights in the modern sense – the right to 
reproduce intangible intellectual creations – but rather rights in “copies,” the physical product, regardless of 
whether the work of authorship was ancient or contemporary.” WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND 
PRACTICE 8 (The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1994) 
11
 It is said that “copyright was born of a very specific set of restrictions: It forbade others from reprinting a 
book” and “[i]t did not go beyond that very narrow right. It did not control any more generally how a work 
could be used.” LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 87 (The Penguin Press 2004) 
12 LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 9 (Vanderbilt University Press 1968) 
13
 It is said that “[a]ny attempt to state the precise nature of the stationer’s copyright calls for a word of 
caution. Since businessmen developed and shaped it to their own ends, there was little or no regard for 
underlying principles or a sound theoretical basis for copyright.” See id. at 9 
14
 It is said that “the printing presses, with its ability to make multiple copies of a work easily, is frequently 
cited as the impetus for efforts to secure a more formal type of protection for books.” WILLIAM F. PATRY, 
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1994) 
15
 Russ VerSteeg, The Roman Law Roots of Copyright, 59 MD. L. REV. 522, 525 (2000)  
16
 The effect of copying a literary work without the permission of the author is aptly explained by 
Augustine Birrell, when he referring to the “art of printing,” states that “[i]f the author had a private 
printing press he could publish an edition for himself, but, as this is unusual, he employs and pays a printer 
and a bookseller. The edition is circulated, and each buyer of a copy becomes the owner of a copy of a 
book which is his to read and to lend, to sell, or to leave to his heirs. But every copy supposes an original 
which subsists somewhere in splendid isolation, whatever may be the number of the copies, and were the 
purchaser of a single copy to reproduce other copies from it he would thereby wholly or in part destroy the 
value of the property still in the hands of the owner of the original. To do this would be a wrongful act, and 
is usually so regarded whilst the author lives.” AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, THE LAW AND HISTORY OF 
COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 15-16 (Cassell and Company, Limited 1899) 
17
 464 U.S. 417 (1983) 
18
 464 U.S. at 430 
5the printing presses, piracy of literary works was not a perceived threat to authors of 
literary works as the reproduction of a manuscript by hand was a task that was both 
laborious and time consuming to scribes of the work.19 As the making of another copy of 
a manuscript took such a long time, the distribution of copies of manuscripts did not 
reach very far and hence did not threaten the livelihood of an author of literary works. 
The introduction of a new technology that allowed for the reproduction of literary works 
on a massive scale, the printing press, by William Caxton in Westminster in 1476, 
changed this idyllic literary setting by allowing copies of literary works to be 
technologically reproduced.20
The Government of England received the printing press with mixed feelings.21
The print technology gave rise to the print industry, which was a new industry to be 
encouraged. Yet print technology facilitated the reproduction and distribution of 
materials, which may have been detrimental to Government interests. As the British 
Crown took “an acute interest in this dangerous art”22 of print technology as it was 
introduced23 and began to “assert prerogative rights regarding it.”24 The Crown did this 
by setting up a Royal Printer in 1485 and granting royal privileges and printing patents on 
the exclusive right to print particular books from 1518 onwards.25 With the enactment of 
the Act of Supremacy, which declared Henry VIII to be the “Supreme Head of the 
Church of England,” in 1534, England became separated from the Roman Catholic 
Church and the “ferment occasioned by the separation”26 resulted in “continual unrest in 
England,”27 thus making “censorship and press control perennial policies of the Tudor 
19
 It is explained that “[i]n ancient times, writings were made on clay tablets, stone, metal plates, wood, 
papyrus, animal skins and parchment. Suitable materials were often expensive and scarce, and writing on 
these materials could be difficult and time consuming. Transporting and preserving these writings would 
also be difficult. Under these conditions, the logistics of copying writings served as barriers to large scale 
copying and distribution of writings.” Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: 
Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 377-378 (2004) 
20
 “The moveable type printing presses,” it is said, “facilitated efficient, mass duplication of a single 
manuscript. The importance of the printing press can hardly be overstated. With multiple copies and 
decreased costs associated with printing, literature became more accessible. Printing also doubtlessly saved 
many works from extinction. Printing not only made possible the mass production of books, but also 
assured their accuracy.” See id. at 378
21
 “The introduction of the printing press into England,” it has been said, “meant for the Government at first 
a new trade to be encouraged, and then an instrument to be controlled.” See LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, 
COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 21 (Vanderbilt University Press 1968) 
22 BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 3 (Columbia University Press 1967) 
23
 The introduction of the printing presses that allowed printers to produce large number of copies relatively 
quickly and inexpensively led to the development of a “potentially large, new market of readers” as well as 
the “need to protect authors and publishers/booksellers from pirates bent on stealing that new market.” 
WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 6 (The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1994)  
24 BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 3 (Columbia University Press 1967)  
25
 It is explained that “[t]he uncontrolled dissemination of literary works and political treatises could invite 
sedition; also, printing, along with other emerging industries, gave the Crown a new source of revenue and 
favors. By granting an exclusive right – a patent, it was called – to print particular literary or legal or 
educational works to a given bookseller, the English sovereigns were able to tap into a continuing stream of 
loyalty and income.” PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY 40 (Hill and Wang 1994) 
26 LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 21 (Vanderbilt University Press 
1968)
27 See id. at 21  
6and Stuart sovereigns.”28 Censorship and press control were achieved through the official 
licensing for the printing of books. In 1557, under the reign of Queen Mary, the 
Stationers’ Company was chartered to become the official guardian of royal censorship 
and was granted the exclusive right to print literary works. The “entire formative period 
of early copyright”29 occurred in this period when censorship was regarded as a major 
policy of the English sovereign during a period of religious and political ferment. With 
the charter granted to the London stationers, printers and publishers obtained with the 
charter, a “national monopoly”30 to print literary works and the freedom to create rights, 
which pertained to the ownership of copies of books that eventually developed into 
copyright. As a result of this, copyright is usually reckoned to be a publisher’s right in the 
first place.31 By the grant of exclusive printing rights to the Stationers’ Company, the 
Company was allowed a great degree of monopolistic control over the English book 
publishing trade and had largely used copyright as a mechanism to further their economic 
interest in the industry. 
As the Stationers’ Company asserted rights over the book trade, publishers and 
printers of literary works had in their possession, a very effective means of controlling 
information flow in literary works.32 Copyright gave the Stationers’ Company an absolute 
right to print and publish books.33 This right was a right that existed in perpetuity34 and 
“passed on from one generation of printers to the next.”35 Through this right, members of 
the Stationers’ Company controlled the flow of information by retaining exclusive 
control of the right to print and publish literary works. Authors of literary works were 
given little recognition in the book trade and as result, could not assert any rights over 
their works or control the flow of information.36 An author’s manuscript was sold to 
28 See id. at 21 
29 See id. at 21 
30 See id. at 21
31
 It is explained that “[t]he stationers were businessmen who manufactured and sold books, and to them 
press control was a means to their own ends – government protection of their market monopoly. As Edward 
Arber, commenting on “the virulence of their trade competition,” has said: “We must think of these printers 
and publishers as caring chiefly for their crowns, half-shillings and silver pennies. They bore the yoke of 
[governmental] licensing as best they could, but only as a means to hold themselves harmless from the 
political and ecclesiastical powers. Their business was to live and make money; and keen enough they were 
about it.” These were the men who created the stationer’s copyright – the first English copyright, and thus 
(by way of an indisputable series of casually related events) the direct antecedent of modern American 
copyright. That copyright in the beginning was a publisher’s right is hardly surprising; indeed, it is 
remarkable that later it somehow came to be known as an author’s right.” L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY 
W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT 20 (University of Georgia Press 1981) 
32
 It has been said that “[i]n the sixteenth century, no agency for controlling property was more vigorous 
than the Stationers’ Company; and in practical effect on copyright, none was more powerful.” HARRY 
RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE 29 (University of Texas Press 1956) 
33
 The Stationers’ Company was regarded to be the “immediate source of the authority to print, bind and 
sell books.” PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY 41 (Hill and Wang 1994)
34
 The rights that the stationers had could be transferred by “sale, gift or inheritance.” It is further said that 
“these private copyrights were of unlimited duration.” Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and 
Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 397-
398 (2004)
35 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY 41 (Hill and Wang 1994)
36
 Until the Statute of Anne 1710, codifying copyright into law, “the author’s legal significance was not 
written into law” and the “social and psychological attitudes of authors toward the significance of their own 
7printers and publishers and with the sale of the manuscript, an author also sold the 
exclusive right to print and publish the book.37 The Stationers’ Company retained the 
status quo and control over the book trade through continuous lobbying for censorship 
laws38 to support their continuous monopoly over the print business by arguing that 
censorship was necessary to maintain order within the book trade,39 an argument, which 
found favor with the English Crown40 at a time when the Government was concerned 
with press regulation to curb the publication of heresies and seditious materials and 
maintain social order.41
The Stationers’ Company began to lose control over the book trade with the lapse 
and non renewal of the last censorship law, the Licensing Act 1662 in 1694.42 As the 
work and toward the ownership of literary composition” were not entirely clear. Writers such as John 
Milton, whose eloquence in the Areopagitica called for the protection of literary works from unauthorized 
copying, defended the booksellers’ copyright and not authors’ rights. HARRY RANSOM, THE FIRST 
COPYRIGHT STATUTE 11 (University of Texas Press 1956)
37
 It is explained that “living authors furnished some of the material for the printing mills, and increasingly 
these manuscript had to be purchased in a business way (usually payment was made in a lump sum); but 
upon entry the author dropped away and it was the stationer who had the right of multiplication of copies 
against others of the Company, which is to say, speaking imprecisely, against all those eligible to print.” 
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 5 (Columbia University Press 1967)
38
 As the stationer’s copyright existed together with censorship laws, in the 16th and early 17th centuries, the 
Company exercised its powers with the assistance of the Star Chamber Courts that were charged with the 
enforcement of censorship laws. Decrees from the Star Chamber courts enjoyed the force of law and by the 
Star Chamber decrees of 1586 and 1637, the Company’s powers were affirmed and the registration of 
works in the Company’s books before publication became a requirement for copyright protection. As a 
result, the Company, with the assistance of the Star Chamber courts, managed to assert control over the 
book trade and the Government with the help of the Company, censored the press and limited the 
dissemination of objectionable materials. Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright 
Law: Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 398-399 (2004)
39
 It is stated that “[t]he stationers early perceived the value of censorship regulations to support their 
monopoly, and they never lost sight of that point. Indeed, their continual lobbying was such that the long-
continued existence of censorship in England can be attributed in large measure to them, although they 
were not always successful in their efforts.” LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 115 (Vanderbilt University Press 1968)
40
 In 1559, Queen Elizabeth confirmed the Company’s charter. It is said that the Queen knew “that 
conditions of the Company’s operation were ideally suited to growth and expansion, and useful for 
guarding interests of the Crown. Behind the Company was an old tradition; sustaining it was a strong 
monarchy; directing its fortunes were good businessmen. The press regulation conducted by the Stationers 
was naturally inseparable from copyright, for copyright was inseparable from the Company’s interests.” 
HARRY RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE 36-37 (University of Texas Press 1956)     
40 LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 114 (Vanderbilt University Press 
1968)
41
 It is said that “[i]n considering the origins of copyright, two things must never be forgotten. First, the 
Church and her priesthood, frightened – and who dare say unreasonably frightened? – at the New Learning, 
and at the independence and lawlessness of mind and enthusiasm that accompanied the New Learning; and 
second, the guilds or trade unions; jealous of their privileges, ever at war one with another, and making 
their appeal to the Crown for protection against outside interference with their strictly defined domains of 
business.” AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 49 (Cassell and 
Company, Limited 1899) 
42
 Parliament’s House of Commons rejected a renewal of the Licensing Act 1662 and provided its reasons 
in an elaborate argument that is believed to have been drafted by John Locke. According to the House of 
Commons, “the illegality of Stationers’ monopolies, the lack of point and definiteness of the regulations 
8Stationers’ Company began to lose control over the book trade, the assertion of author’s 
property rights in literary works became a viable strategy that the stationers adopted to 
maintain their monopoly power. Although there were no statutory or judicial recognition 
of an author’s property rights in literary works prior to the Statute of Anne 1710, authors 
such as Daniel Defoe, had set the stage upon which the stationers may present their 
arguments for authorship rights.43 As the Government’s policy for censorship and press 
control slowly dwindled, the stationers lost their primary tool for maintaining order 
within the book trade.44 On February 26, 1706, the stationers submitted a new law to 
Parliament for a bill to secure property in books and did not base their arguments on the 
revival of licensing or censorship.45 Rather, the stationers argued that the disorder in the 
book trade was a discouragement to authors from writing books that were of public 
benefit.46 The resulting statute, The Statute of Anne 1710, embodied much of the 
arguments surrounding the passing of the bill and introduced two concepts that were not 
originally part of the stationer’s copyright, but which are pivotal to the present copyright 
regime in the United States. 
The Statute of Anne 1710 introduced first, a statutory limitation to the perpetual 
right of the booksellers to break the control that the booksellers had over the print 
industry.47 This statutory limitation on the perpetual right to copy had the effect of 
limiting the power that the Stationers’ Company held over the book trade48 since its 
and the improbability of successful prosecution of breaches of printing restrictions in courts of common 
law,” were sufficient reasons to reject the renewal of the Licensing Act. HARRY RANSOM, THE FIRST 
COPYRIGHT STATUTE 89 (University of Texas Press 1956)
43
 Defoe had opposed the institution of licensing and had acknowledged that the recognition of authorial 
property in literary works through an Act of Parliament would restrain the licentiousness of the press and 
put an end to piracy. MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS 34-35 (Harvard University Press 1993)          
44
 It is said that after the expiration of the Licensing Act 1664, “[l]icensing, regulation of copy and other 
Parliamentary restriction of the press which had characterized the mid-seventeenth century were now things 
of the past. Attempts to establish a new press regulation act in 1698 failed, and from that time until 1710, 
no suggestion for regulation of trade was put into practical effect.” HARRY RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT 
STATUTE 89 (University of Texas Press 1956) 
45 LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 142 (Vanderbilt University Press 
1968) 
46
 The position taken by the stationers is aptly explained when it is stated that “[t]he stationers made the 
case that they could not produce the fragile commodities called books, and thus encourage learned men to 
write them, without protection against piracy; but no one, we can be sure, deliberated what strange results 
might follow if the same logic were applied to other fragile ventures outside the book field. It is hard to 
know how far the interests of authors were considered in distinction from those of publishers.” BENJAMIN 
KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 7-8 (Columbia University Press 1967)  
47
 The Statute provided for the statutory limitation by making a distinction between old books and new 
books. For old books, the Statute provided authors, who had printed but not yet transferred their rights and 
booksellers and others who had purchased the copy of any book to print them, a twenty-one year term 
protection from April 10, 1710. For new books, the Statute provided authors with the exclusive right to 
print the book for a fourteen year period and if the author is still alive after the fourteen year period, they 
would have the same right for another fourteen year period. AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, THE LAW AND HISTORY 
OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 94-95 (Cassell and Company, Limited 1899)
48
 It is said that the “Stationers’ Company ended up getting far less than it had petitioned for because 
Parliament, instead of recognizing perpetual rights, passed a law limiting the exclusive right of publication 
to a set term of years and containing other provisions limiting power previously enjoyed by the Stationers.” 
WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 11 (The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. 1994)
9formation in 1557.49 After the expiration of the copyright, the work will fall into the 
public domain50 to ultimately serve the public interest of learning, education and 
development.51 In light of the history that led to the passing of the Statute, it does appear 
that Parliament had intended to transform the stationer’s copyright, which was originally 
a device for censorship and an instrument to maintain the stationer’s monopoly, into a 
law that may serve to destroy the booksellers’ monopoly by providing for a limited 
copyright protection term, making copyright available to anyone and introducing price 
control provisions, which were created in response to the high prices that the booksellers 
had charged for the sales of their books.52 As a curtailment on the stationer’s perpetual 
monopoly over the book trade, the Statute of Anne had also introduced the pubic domain, 
in which copyrighted works were to eventually rest after their copyright had expired. 
Prior to the Statute of Anne, all literature belonged to the bookseller in perpetuity and 
could only be printed if the strict standards of censorship were met.53 The exclusive 
implementation of the stationer’s copyright had been outside the purview of the courts 
and was only subject to self-regulation within the Stationers’ Company.54 With the 
Statute of Anne, however, copyright was only granted to a new work, had a limited 
duration of protection to a maximum duration of 28 years (a 14 year term, which is 
renewable for another 14 years), and encompassed only the right to print, publish and 
vend, thus creating a public domain that was not within the exclusive control of the 
Stationers’ Company.55
The Statute of Anne 1710 introduced second, the author as a legitimate right 
holder to break the monopoly, which the booksellers had over the print industry. The 
recognition of the author has today allowed creative content producers to assert very 
strong rights over the uses of their creative works as well as the flow of information in 
copyrighted works in the digital world. The control, which creative content producers 
49
 It is explained that “[e]ven before the printing press, craftsmen involved in the bookmaking and 
bookselling trades organized in England to protect their interests. In 1357, there was a craft guild for 
scriveners (those who copied text) and limners (those who illustrated manuscripts) in London, referred to as 
the Brotherhood of Manuscript Producers. Later, in 1403, a guild for scriveners, limners, bookbinders and 
booksellers was created. Those involved in the book trade, particularly printers and booksellers, became 
known as the “stationers,” and about 1510, a voluntary association, or “Brotherhood of the Stationers,” was 
formed. This Brotherhood of Stationers became officially recognized by a royal charter granted on May 4, 
1557 and was known as the Stationers’ Company or the Company of Stationers.” Craig W. Dallon, The 
Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 391-392 (2004)
50 LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 145 (Vanderbilt University Press 
1968)
51
 It is said that the Statute of Anne 1710, “had as its foremost objective, the encouragement of learning – a 
general public interest – not the private economic interests of authors, printers or publishers. It did have a 
secondary interest for the economic security of authors and other proprietors of books and writings, but this 
secondary concern was driven by the impact that the void of regulation had upon the creation of “useful 
books.”” Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past and 
Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 409 (2004)
52 L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT 29 (University of Georgia 
Press 1991) 
53 See id. at 30
54 See id. at 30
55 See id. at 30 
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have over copyrighted materials today, is one of the more significant driving forces 
shaping the role of copyright law in the digital age. This is so even though the inclusion 
of the author as a legitimate copyright holder under the Statute of Anne 171056 is said to 
be “more a matter of form than of substance”57 because “the monopolies at which the 
statute was aimed were too long established to be attacked without some basis for 
change”58 and “the most logical and natural basis for the changes was the author.”59 It is 
noted that the benefit of the Statute to authors is really minimal and only protected 
authors in so far as they were being remunerated for their work since authors would have 
to assign their copyright to a stationer in order to be paid.60 As the introduction of 
authors’ rights in the Statute of Anne 1710 was more of a solution to address the growing 
monopolistic control that the stationers had over the book trade rather than an overt 
statutory recognition of rights that authors ought to have in their creative works,61 the 
Statute ought not to be regarded as settling “the theoretical questions behind the notion of 
literary property.”62 The Statute, nonetheless, did “represent a significant moment in a 
process of cultural transformation.”63 Following a period in which “censorship and 
copyright were deeply intertwined,”64 it is said “the passage of the statute marked the 
divorce of copyright from censorship and the reestablishment of copyright under the 
rubric of property rather than regulation.”65 It is through the provision of property rights 
in creative works, which allow authors to assert control over uses of their works for 
further developmental and transformative uses. 
The Statute of Anne carries some important aspect of copyright law into the 
present. The Statute of Anne was the first law, which provided for a limited right over 
printed books for the encouragement of learning. By recognizing the potential for 
oppressive monopolies to emerge from the grant of a perpetual right in printed books, 
56
 It is said that the most significant part about the Statute of Anne 1710 is that “an “author” was the person 
initially entitled to copyright. Thus the seeds were sown for regarding copyright as the reward and 
protection of the author’s intellectual and creative effort.” Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of 
American Copyright Law: Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1140 
(1983) 
57 LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 147 (Hill and Wang 1994) 
58 See id. at 147
59 See id. at 147  
60 L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT 28 (University of Georgia 
Press 1991) 
61
 It is said that “[i]t is hard to know how far the interests of authors were considered in distinction from 
those of publishers. There is an apparent tracing of rights to an ultimate source in the fact of authorship, but 
before attaching large importance to this, we have to note that if printing as a trade was not to be put back 
into the hands of a few as a subject of monopoly – if the statute was indeed to be a kind of “universal 
patent” – a draftsman would naturally be led to express himself in terms of rights in books and hence of 
initial rights in authors.” BENJAMIN KAPLAN, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 8 (Columbia 
University Press 1967) 
62 MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS 48 (Harvard University Press 1968) 
63
 The transformation occurred in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, where a “general feeling for the 
author’s personal interests ha[d] developed in England and elsewhere.” This feeling was “based more on 
ideas of honor and reputation than on property in the economic sense” and “had emerged in the context of a 
traditional patronage society.”  See id. at 48
64 See id. at 48
65 See id. at 48
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Parliament introduced a limitation to the copyright term to put a curb on the existence of 
the stationer’s copyright in perpetuity.66  The expiration of the copyright term would 
allow the work to fall into the public domain and enable the greater public to access the 
work, and hence to encourage learning, education and development. In its attempt to 
regulate the print business and restore order to the trade, the Statute of Anne had also 
recognized that authors had rights in their work, which although assignable to a printer, 
were nevertheless rights that belonged to authors, granting to authors a legal standing to 
pursue their rights in a court of law as proprietors of their rights. The introduction of the 
author into the book-publishing scene removed the law of copyright completely from the 
previous realm of censorship and licensing, which had given rise to the stationer’s 
monopoly in the 16th century. In this sense, the notion of proprietary authorship put an 
end to the censorship and licensing regime that the English Parliament sought to end with 
the expiration of the Licensing Act 1662 in 1694.  
The early control over the book publishing trade by the Stationers’ Company had 
allowed booksellers in England to control the flow of information in literary works by 
limiting and keeping an account of printers and publishers, which were allowed to print 
and publish books.67 By keeping the right to print and publish exclusively to members of 
the Stationers’ Company, the Company was able to exert a monopolistic control over the 
book printing and publishing trade,68 thereby preventing the unauthorized printing and 
publication of literary works and restraining the flow of information69 towards individual 
readers, who purchase their books.70 The passing of the Statute of Anne 1710 however, 
created a larger purpose for the grant of copyrights in books and acknowledged a more 
66
 By imposing a time limitation upon copyright, there would be an increase in competition within the book 
trade as valuable books would become available to any publisher for publication after the expiration of the 
copyright. In this way, Parliament, in passing the Statute of Anne 1710, was able to “spread the wealth of 
valuable books” within the English book trade. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 89 (The Penguin Press 
2004) 
67
 By entering the Company’s register books, the bookseller, in whose name the entry was made becomes 
the owner or proprietor of the book or copy and is granted the exclusive right to print the work, 
“presumably forever.”  AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 73 (Cassell 
and Company, Limited 1899)
68
 The Company’s charter provided that “No person within this our realm of England or the dominions of 
the same shall practise or exercise by himself, or by his ministers, his servants or by any other person the 
art or mistery of printing any book or any thing for sale or traffic within this our realm of England or the 
dominions of the same, unless the same person at the time of his foresaid mistery or art of Stationery of the 
foresaid City, or has therefore license of us or the heirs or successors of us the foresaid Queen by the letters 
patent of us or the heirs or successors of us the foresaid Queen.” LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 32 (Vanderbilt University Press 1968)
69
 The charter that set the Stationers’ Company up empowered the Company to establish “ordinances, 
provisions and statutes” to govern its members. The grant of a monopoly on printing through the charter 
and the power to control its members effectively allowed the company to set rules for printing and 
publication. With this authority, the Stationers’ Company could establish internal rules that amounted to 
private copyrights. Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past 
and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 392-393 (2004)
70
 The Crown’s policy for press control was severe and the Company, by virtue of its charter was given the 
power to search out, seize and destroy books printed in contravention of monopoly or against sound 
Catholic doctrine. The Stationers were to “take away, have burn, or convert to their own use whatever they 
should think was contrary to the form of any statute, act, or proclamation made or to be made.” HARRY 
RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE 29 (University of Texas Press 1956)
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fundamental reason for protecting literary works, which is to encourage learning and 
education. The recognition that literary works and creative products are important to 
generate a society’s interest in learning, growth and development produces a freer flow of 
information towards the public domain or society in general, who have become the 
primary beneficiaries of the limitations to perpetual copyright under the Statute of Anne 
1710.71 As society became recognized as having a right to access creative works for 
learning and education, the flow of information in literary works became freer as works, 
which fell into the public domain were creatively used to reproduce new and different 
works of authorship.72 The Disney cartoon stories, for example, are taken from the public 
domain works of the Grimm Brothers and other content, which existed in the culture at 
that time.73 Indeed the monopolistic control of the Stationers’ Company over the book 
trade, which led up to Parliament’s enactment of the Statute of Anne 1710 to curb the 
stationer’s monopolistic practices, gave Congress sufficient guidance in limiting the 
duration of copyright protection under the Constitution.74
71
 The author of creative works is also an important beneficiary of copyright law as the exclusive rights 
granted under the law are intended to be incentives to encourage an author’s creative production. The 
balance between the private and exclusive rights of the author under the law and the public interest in 
access to these works is a constant balance, which copyright law strives to achieve. It is said that the most 
significant part about the Statute of Anne 1710 is that “an “author” was the person initially entitled to 
copyright. Thus the seeds were sown for regarding copyright as the reward and protection of the author’s 
intellectual and creative effort.” Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: 
Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1140 (1983)
72
 Professor Jessica Litman explains the idea more clearly, when she states that “[t]o say that every new 
work is in some sense based on the works that preceded it is such a truism that it has long been a cliché, 
invoked but not examined. But the very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and 
recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea. Composers recombine sounds they 
have heard before; playwrights base their characters on bits and pieces drawn from real human beings and 
other playwrights characters; novelists draw their plots from lives and other plots within their experience; 
software writers use the logic they find in other software; lawyers transform old arguments to fit new facts; 
cinematographers, actors, choreographers, architects and sculptors all engage in the process of adapting, 
transforming and recombining what is already “out there” in some other form. This is not parasitism: it is 
the essence of authorship. And in the absence of a public domain, much of it would be illegal.” Jessica 
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966 (1990)         
73
 Disney works, which have drawn upon existing cultural works include Snow White (1937), Fantasia 
(1940), Pinocchio (1940), Dumbo (1941), Bambi (1942), Song of the South (1946), Cinderella (1950), 
Alice in Wonderland (1951), Robin Hood (1952), Peter Pan (1953), Lady and the Tramp (1955), Mulan 
(1998), Sleeping Beauty (1959), 101 Dalmations (1961), The Sword in the Stone (1963), The Jungle Book 
(1967) and Treasure Planet (2003). See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 23-24 (The Penguin Press 
2004)
74
 It is stated that “[t]o what extent the framers of the Constitution were conscious of the background of this 
checkered background of copyright in England for their purposes, we cannot know. We may assume, 
however, that the history of which copyright was an essential part was not unknown in eighteenth century 
England because of the importance attached to the freedom of press, speech, and religion as demonstrated 
by the adoption of the first amendment. The use of one amendment to ensure the three freedoms was not 
coincidental. The religious strife in England, precipitated by Henry VIII’s break with the Roman Catholic 
Church, was a continual threat to the sovereign’s crown, and was also the wellspring of censorship which 
led not only to laws of seditious libel, but also to copyright as an instrument of press control as well as 
monopoly. In any event, we are justified in assuming that the constitutional purpose of copyright – the 
promotion of learning – requires that copyright be a limited monopoly at most, and a device for censorship 
not at all, for both censorship and monopoly are antithetical to learning.” L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, 
Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations, 38 
UCLA L. REV. 719, 785-786 (1989)       
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When the United States was founded as a new nation, copyright was rapidly 
adopted in the country and authors’ rights became the basis for the American copyright 
system.75 Early American copyright embodies four basic ideas, which are copyright as 
protecting the author’s rights, promoting learning, providing order in the book trade as a 
government grant and preventing harmful monopolies.76 These ideas have been embodied 
within the United States’ copyright regime on several levels. The protection of author’s 
rights, for example, is central to the state statutes. The Constitutional clause, as another 
example, embodies the idea that copyright law is to promote learning in the interest of the 
general public.77 The development of early copyright in the United States differed from 
that in England in several ways. In the United States, authors and not the booksellers led 
the drive for copyright. As a result, no institution in the United States ever came close to 
having the monopolistic control that the Stationers’ Company had over the book trade in 
England. The earliest controversy in the United States was one between national and 
local powers and not one “between London monopolists and provincial pirates.”78
The primary purpose for federal copyright protection in the United States is stated 
in the Constitution. The Constitutional clause provides Congress with the power “to 
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”79 Three policies for protecting creative works may be ascertained from the 
Constitutional clause, which are to promote learning, preserve the public domain and 
benefit the author, whose creative endeavors ought to be rewarded in order that the public 
has sufficient creative materials to learn from and build upon.80 The first federal law 
passed under the Constitutional clause was the Copyright Act 1790, which was entitled 
“An act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and 
books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.” 
Section 1 of the Act provided for two forms of copyrights, which are copyrights for 
maps, charts and books already printed in the United States and for maps, books and 
charts to be printed or published. Section 2 protects printed works from piracy, which 
may be committed by printing, reprinting or publishing a copyrighted work, importing 
copies of copyrighted works or selling a work which infringed a copyright, with the 
knowledge that the work was an infringing copy. It is said that “the rights under 
copyright granted by the statute were not essentially different from those under the 
stationer’s copyright, except of course, for the limited term.”81 Functionally, American 
75 LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 179 (Vanderbilt University Press 
1968) 
76 L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT 181 (University of Georgia 
Press 1991) 
77 See id. at 181
78 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 51 (Hill and Wang 1994) 
79 U.S. CONST. art.1, § 8, cl. 8 
80 L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT 49 (University of Georgia 
Press 1991) 
81 LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 201 (Vanderbilt University Press 
1968)  
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copyright was thought to be “a right to which a given work was subject”82 but because 
copyright was introduced as an author’s right in the United States and was granted by 
statute, the right became “the exclusive source of the author’s protection after 
publication.”83
The introduction of the author as a right holder in creative works and the public as 
the beneficiary of works produced under copyright law has changed the flow of 
information from the author of creative works towards the public in general. The flow of 
information between the publisher of creative works and the individual user, who 
purchases a copy of the work, still exists. However, as new technologies emerge, 
connecting authors to the users of their works, allowing new uses of creative works and 
encouraging public access to these works, the flow of information in creative works is 
radically altered. Information in creative works through digital technologies on the 
Internet flow from an author and reaches countless users. Through digital technologies on 
the Internet, users may also send creative works to each other thereby creating a stream of 
information flow among users. With the introduction of the author and the public domain 
as legitimate interest holders in the law of copyright, the traditional flow of information 
in copyrighted works between the publisher and the purchaser of the work extended to 
include flows of information between the producer of creative works and the general 
public, who are to benefit from the author’s creative endeavors. This flow of information 
in copyrighted works is further increased with the emergence of digital media 
technologies, which make the storage, reproduction and distribution of content easier. 
Part 2 of this paper explores these changes to information flow in copyrighted content as 
a result of digital technologies.      
Part 2: Information Flow in the Copyright Industries in the Digital Age
Technology has a unique way of changing the control that a copyright owner has 
over the work. “Digital technology” has “changed the marketplace”84 by allowing 
ordinary users to make copies of creative works and distribute those works to the general 
public. It is indeed a “cliché that digital technology permits everyone to become a 
publisher”85 but the effect of the Internet and digital technologies on the copyright 
industries is a profound one because basic distribution channels for creative works, which 
have worked well for a long time, change as the number of users, who are able to access 
works, increase on a global scale as a result of the Internet. The change in information 
flow and loss of control over the use of creative works has caused the industries to assert 
their ownership in copyrighted works.  In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,86 the 
motion pictures industry sought to retain control over their copyrighted works by 
restraining the distribution of a computer program called the DeCSS87 through the 
82 See id. at 201
83 See id. at 201 
84 JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 19 (Prometheus Books 2001) 
85 See id. at 19 
86
 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
87
 The DeCSS is a computer program that was developed by computer hackers to circumvent the CSS 
encryption protection system that the motion pictures industry use to protect their motion pictures, which 
are stored in Digital Versatile Discs (hereinafter “DVDs”) containing copies of motion pictures in digitized 
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Internet. The industry brought an action under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act88 to 
prevent the Internet distribution of the program, which sole purpose is to allow users to 
decrypt the encryption code employed by the motion pictures industry in their DVDs. 
The United States District Court for the S.D. of New York decided that in this case, the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act would apply to prevent the distribution of the DeCSS 
through the Internet.89  The sound recording industry’s reaction to the Napster service is 
also another example of the industry’s assertion of greater control over their copyrights as 
the Internet and digital technologies allow music files to be shared through peer-to-peer 
networks and downloaded through the Internet. The millions of music copies, which were 
downloaded and distributed through the Internet, caused the industry to lose control over 
their music and the manner in which music had traditionally been sold to the consumer.90
As new technologies emerge to allow copyrighted works to be used and distributed in a 
manner not anticipated by the industries, the industries have always relied on their 
copyrights to regain control over information flow in copyrighted works.     
This relationship between copyright law and technology is a vibrant one and has 
existed throughout the history of copyright law.91 The effect of technology on the flow of 
information in the copyright industries became apparent when copyright holders and 
technology developers realized that digital technologies running on the Internet allow for 
the reproduction and distribution of content in a manner that is not confined by the 
physical parameters that were previously set by analog technology.92 As digital 
form. These DVDs may only be viewed on players and computer drives that are equipped with licensed 
technology that permits the devices to decrypt and play the films. See id. at 3003    
88
 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2001) 
89
 The Court’s concluding statement illustrates the motion pictures industry’s attempts to retain control over 
the existing industrial structure. The Court stated that “[p]laintiffs have invested huge sums over the years 
in producing motion pictures in reliance upon a legal framework that through the law of copyright has 
ensured that they would have the exclusive right to copy and distribute those motion pictures for economic 
gain. They contend that the advent of new technology should not alter this long established structure.” 111 
F. Supp. 2d at 346 
90
 Professor Peter Menell explains that “Napster’s peer-to-peer technology has had the most dramatic 
effects on the traditional music distribution marketplace, vastly expanding the public’s access to and 
interest in MP3 encoded sound recordings. Within weeks of its public release, millions of copies were 
downloaded and hundreds of millions of copies of sound recordings had been exchanged. It is no 
exaggeration to say that Napster caused profound changes in consumer behavior, transforming within a 
matter of months how millions of consumers gained access to music and accelerating the transition to a 
digital music platform.” Peter S. Menell, Can Our Current Conception of Copyright Law Survive the 
Internet Age?: Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 144 (2002)    
91
 Peter S. Menell, Can Our Current Conception of Copyright Law Survive the Internet Age?: Envisioning 
Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 163 (2002). Although the development of the 
Internet and digital technologies has made this relationship more evident today, this relationship between 
copyright law and technology has always existed. Throughout the history of copyright law, new 
technologies have to a large extent served the interests of the copyright holders by the creation of new 
markets for content. While tensions arose from time to time with these new technologies, with particular 
content niches suffering at times, from an overall perspective, both the content and technology sectors of 
the economy has generally benefited from new technologies in what Professor Peter Menell best describes 
as a “symbiotic relationship” between content owners and technology developers.  
92
 There has been harmony in the relationship between content owners and technology developers primarily 
because there is an inherent limitation on analog technology platforms, which limit the unauthorized 
reproduction and distribution of works of authorship. The digital technology platform today does not have 
16
technologies increase public access to creative works and as the industry loses control 
over the public’s uses of these works, copyright law’s role in ensuring continuous control 
over information flow is questioned.93 The introduction of new technologies into the 
marketplace has the effect of causing industries to adapt and change as they respond to 
the new technology.94 The advent of the Internet and related digital technologies, such as 
video streaming technologies,95 peer-to-peer file sharing software96 and portable digital 
audio technologies97 have cumulatively caused an “industrial revolution”98 within the 
copyright industries, in particular, the sound recording industry.  These changes, which 
are brought about by new technologies, disrupt conventional business models and 
industrial structures that have allowed content to be successfully commercialized thus far. 
such constraints and, defined by its characteristic of allowing content to be “inexpensively, quickly and 
flawlessly reproduced and distributed widely with relatively little risk of detection,” the digital platform 
allows users of copyrighted works to do what used to be impossible on prior technological platforms. See 
id. at 164   
93
 It is said that “[n]otwithstanding the tremendous reach of copyright, the major content industries have 
come to believe that existing law may not be adequate to protect content in the digital age. The rapid rise of 
peer-to-peer networks and the success of hackers in cracking and disseminating means of decrypting the 
DVD Content Scrambling System (and other technological protection measures) demonstrate the 
vulnerability of the current network architecture to widespread unauthorized distribution and the limited 
capacity of existing legal protection to combat “digital piracy.” Moreover, the intrusive and chilling effects 
of copyright’s most recent protections against digital piracy have aroused concerns about the freedom of 
technology companies to innovate, the “rights” of consumers to engage in fair use of protected works, the 
ability of computer programmers to study encryption techniques, the privacy of Internet users, and 
competition in content creation and distribution. Just about everyone with a computer, an Internet 
connection, and a desire to access content has become aware of the raging debate over copyright’s proper 
role.” Peter S. Menell, Can Our Current Conception of Copyright Law Survive the Internet Age? 
Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 66-67 (2002)   
94
 It is said that “[t]he early industrial revolution can only be understood in terms of the interactions of a 
few basic technologies that provided the essential foundation for other technological changes in a series of 
ever-widening concentric circles, at the heart of which were a few major innovations in steam power, 
metallurgy (primarily iron), and the large -scale utilization of mineral fuels. One can identify similar kinds 
of clustering around electrification beginning in the late nineteenth century, the internal combustion engine 
in the early twentieth century, and plastics, electronics and the computer in more recent years. In each case 
a central innovation, or a small number of innovations, provided the basis around which a larger number of 
further cumulative improvements and complementary inventions were eventually positioned.” NATHAN 
ROSENBERG, INSIDE THE BLACK BOX: TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 59 (Cambridge University Press 
1999) 
95
 Streaming technologies allow users of content to see a video or listen to an audio file on the Internet 
without having to download the file onto their computers. The file is streamed onto the user’s computer 
from a remote server in several portions, which allows a user to have access to the file while it is still being 
downloaded. See Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: Copyright Protection 
of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845 (1997)  
96
 Peer-to-peer file sharing software usually operates on a network that allows its users to communicate and 
share files with one another. A user of the Napster service, for example, had the option of sharing MP3 
music files with other online Napster users. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 905 
(2000)    
97
 A portable digital audio device that was built in 1988 by Diamond Multimedia Systems allowed users to 
download MP3 music files from a computer, store the files on a small device about the size of an audio 
cassette and listen to the music elsewhere. Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond 
Multimedia Systems, Inc., 180 F. 3d 1072, 1073 (1999)     
98 NATHAN ROSENBERG, INSIDE THE BLACK BOX: TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 59 (Cambridge 
University Press 1999) 
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It appears a natural response for copyright industries to assert more control over business 
models that have been successful in the past.
The move to control new uses of existing content through copyright law has been 
successful in some cases. When the motion pictures industry began producing movies for 
the general public, there was a need for ideas to inspire the production of motion pictures. 
The industry began to produce motion pictures based on existing works without prior 
consent from copyright owners. In Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros.,99 the Kalem Company 
hired a writer to read General Lew Wallace’s novel, Ben Hur, and write a scenario for a 
motion picture, which it then produced without securing a copyright license100 for the 
production of a motion picture. In this case, the Supreme Court had to decide if the public 
exhibition of the motion picture was a dramatization of Ben Hur and an infringement of 
copyright in the novel. Justice Holmes, in delivering the decision of the Court, held that 
moving pictures can be used to dramatize a novel and when that is done, as in this case, 
there is an infringement of the right, which the statute reserves.101 Relying on the case of 
Daly v. Palmer,102 wherein the Circuit Court S.D. New York held that an author’s 
depiction of a “rail road” scene in a dramatic composition or play was protected by 
copyright law, Justice Holmes gave a broad construction103 to the meaning of 
dramatization of a work under the Copyright Act 1891. With cognizance for the fact that 
the motion picture was an exploitation of the novel using a film technology that was new 
at that time, Justice Holmes acknowledged that the dramatization of a novel need not 
necessarily be done by speech and may be instead be achieved by action, when in his 
judgment he says, “[a]ction can tell a story, display the most vivid relations between men, 
and depict every kind of human emotion, without the aid of a word. It would be 
impossible to deny the title of drama to pantomime as played by masters of the art”.104
The implication of the case of Kalem Company v. Harper Brothers is that 
theatrical exhibitions of film have now fallen under the purview of copyright law. 
Arguably, by bringing motion pictures within the scope of the Copyright Act as a form of 
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expression that infringes upon an author’s copyright, Justice Holmes had allowed a new 
technology, the motion pictures production technology, which allows for new forms of 
exploitation of an existing literary work, to fall within copyright’s control. There may be 
justification for Justice Holmes’s decision on the premise that an economically important 
medium had then emerged for the expression of creative works – the theatrical exhibition 
of films. Together with other factors such as a “narrow statutory phrase” under the 
copyright law, a “hesitant Congress” to react to the changing technological environment 
and Justice Holmes’s intent on “building a bridge between copyright and popular 
culture,”105 this case was decided in favor of the plaintiff for more extensive copyright 
protection. The copyright scope was also extended, when the Court decided that the 
producers of motion pictures were accomplices in the exhibition of the film.106 Relying 
on Justice Holmes’s reasoning that the performance of an act constituted a dramatization 
of a novel, it would have been the exhibitors and not the producers of the motion picture, 
who were liable for copyright infringement. Nonetheless, Justice Holmes expanded the 
scope of copyright further by applying the law to the party, who made the infringement 
possible in the first place and in this case, they were the producers of the film. By making 
the films available for exhibition, Justice Holmes was of the opinion that the “producers 
had effectively participated in the infringement and thus could be held as 
accomplices.”107 This effectively extended copyright law to cover film production 
technology, which until the decision of Kalem Company v. Harper Brothers, was not 
under the purview of copyright law.     
With Kalem Company v. Harper Brothers,108 a copyright owner had 
control over the use of the work for film production and film producers and exhibitors 
would have to obtain the consent of the copyright owner before producing and exhibiting 
a movie based on an existing copyrighted work. With the production of motion pictures 
falling within the purview of copyright law, motion pictures itself as a form of creative 
art was soon protected as a copyrightable subject matter under the 1912 amendments to 
the Copyright Act.109 Motion pictures was protected as a photograph under the Copyright 
Act 1870,110 and the ruling in Edison v. Lubin,111 indicated a willingness by the courts to 
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extend copyright protection to creative works, which were produced by newer 
technologies. These works that were produced by new technologies were protected within
existing categories of copyrightable subject matter under the Copyright Act. The shift in 
copyright law towards the protection of motion pictures reflected a more general cultural 
change, where “reverence for originality and a scorn for imitation” was prevalent.112
There may be however a subtle recognition for the huge investments made in the 
production of films by production companies, which justified a copyright monopoly over 
motion pictures. When copyright protection was given to motion pictures in the 
Copyright Act 1912,113 it was because “the money invested therein is so great and the 
property rights so valuable.”114
In some cases however, the courts have been more cautious in extending 
copyright protection to new uses of copyrighted works, allowing a freer flow of 
information in content towards the general public. The major technological change within 
the U.S. motion pictures industry occurred with the introduction of the video cassette 
recorder (hereinafter “VCR”), which allowed a home user to record televised motion 
pictures off a television set and play them back later or to “time shift” the broadcast of a 
motion picture on a television set from its broadcast time to a later time.115 The Supreme 
Court addressed the new technology by considering consumer choice as to how new 
technology was used in their home to be the most important in the Court’s analysis of 
whether copyright in televised motion pictures is infringed by consumer use of VCRs. 
The consumer had responded well to the introduction of the VCR in the market place116
and had used the VCR primarily for “time-shifting.” Time-shifting enabled viewers to see 
programs they would otherwise miss because they were not at home, were occupied with 
other tasks, or were viewing a program on another station at the time of a broadcast that 
they desired to watch.117 The District Court in this case inclined towards protecting the 
private consumption of copyrighted materials. According to the District Court, non-
commercial home use recording of materials broadcasted over the public airways was a 
fair use of copyrighted works and did not constitute copyright infringement. The Court 
subjects of copyright protection. While such advance has resulted in a different type of photograph, yet it is 
nonetheless a photograph – a picture produced by photographic process.”  122 Fed. Rep. 240, 242 (1903)
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emphasized the fact that the materials were broadcasted free to the public at large, the 
noncommercial character of the use, and the private character of the activity conducted 
entirely within the home. The Court also recognized that the purpose of this use served 
the public interest by increasing access to television programming, an interest that “is 
consistent with the First Amendment policy of providing the fullest access to information 
through the public airwaves.” 118
The Court of Appeals however, took a different view. The Court reversed the 
District Court’s decision and concluded that as a matter of law, the home use of a VCR 
could not be a fair use because it was not a “productive use.” The Court held that it was 
unnecessary for the plaintiffs to prove any harm to the potential market for the 
copyrighted works, but then observed that it seemed clear that the cumulative effect of 
mass reproduction made possible by the VCR would tend to diminish the potential 
market for the copyright owner’s work.119 It appears from the Court of Appeals’ 
reasoning that the Court took a more expansive view of the role of copyright in protecting 
a creative work. The Court thought that where consumers of copyrighted materials 
attached economic value to the use of the work in a particular manner, the copyright 
owner ought to be given the opportunity to exploit that market.120 The extension of the 
copyright owner’s right to markets wherein there is an economic value appears logical 
given the premise that copyright law is intended to allow the producer of creative works 
to capture some of the economic benefits that stem from investing and producing the 
creative work. By providing a producer of creative work with control over the work, the 
producer may prevent others from taking advantage of these economic benefits by 
exploiting the work because this undermines the very incentive for the producer to make 
these investments in the first place.121
The Supreme Court was more conservative in extending the copyright owner’s 
rights over VCR technology. According to the Court, the judiciary had always been 
reluctant to expand the protection afforded by copyright without explicit legislative 
guidance.122 More importantly, the Court recognized the competing interests involved 
whenever a new technology enters any copyright industry and the importance of drawing 
118
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a balance amongst competing interests.123 In this case, the Supreme Court regarded the 
private uses by the consumer to be an important factor that ought to be considered in 
deciding whether the use of the VCR technology was an infringement of the copyright 
owner’s exclusive rights. The inclusion of the private consumer of creative works and 
their freedom to enjoy the benefits of a new technology in the privacy of their homes in 
the Court’s analysis was a step, which the Court took to assess the fair value of a new 
technology introduced into the market and whether use of it should be considered 
unauthorized on the basis that the copyright owner objects to the uses to which the new 
technology puts its works. Sony v. Universal City Studio124 illustrates the Supreme 
Court’s regard for the consumer’s private uses of a creative work to be outside the reach 
of the copyright owner even when there appears to be a threat posed by a new technology 
to the copyright owner’s rights. Indeed, a consumer may choose to skip a commercial, 
fast forward the program to favored scenes125 or simply record televised programs for the 
purposes of building a library,126 and this does not differ from a purchaser of a novel 
reading only specific parts of the novel, skipping parts of the novel or making copies of 
the novel for a private home library. It would be difficult to imagine with the introduction 
of the photocopier machine, a new technology introduced in 1960,127 that a novelist 
would have control over his novel to the extent that a purchaser of the novel may be 
prohibited from making copies of the novel on a private home photocopier. Even the 
making of photocopies of medical journals by the National Institutes of Health and the 
National Library of Medicine for physicians and medical researchers for use in their 
professional work was thought to be outside the control of the publisher, who was the 
owner of the copyright over the medical journals.128 The point to be made is that the 
control of a copyright owner over his work does not necessarily stretch to every new use 
of the work with a new technology.
The Supreme Court in Sony v. Universal City Studios,129 dealt with a novel and 
new technology by considering largely the general societal benefits, which the new 
technology brought and regarded that these benefits far outweighed a more nebulous 
claim by the copyright owner that the use of the VCR crosses “invisible boundaries” of 
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control that a copyright owner has over his programs.130 Regarding the use of the VCR 
for home time-shifting purposes to be a fair use of a copyright owner’s content, the 
Supreme Court emphasized the requirement that the copyright owner demonstrate some 
likelihood of harm before a private act of time-shifting is to be condemned as a violation 
of federal law.131 The Supreme Court, referring to the Court of Appeal’s analysis that the 
use of content may be regarded to be fair use only when such use is productive, regarded 
the lower court’s reasoning to be erroneous. According to the Supreme Court, Congress 
has plainly instructed the courts that a fair use analysis calls for a sensitive balancing of 
interests and whilst the distinction between “productive” and “unproductive uses” may be 
helpful in calibrating the balance, it cannot be wholly determinative.132 More importantly, 
according to the Supreme Court, the statutory provision requires a consideration of the 
economic consequences of copying.133 As it was demonstrated that a substantial number 
of copyright holders would not object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by private 
viewers134 and as it could not be shown that time-shifting would cause any likelihood of 
non-minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted works, the 
Supreme Court decided that the VCR was capable of substantial non-infringing uses and 
the sale of the VCR to the general public did not constitute contributory infringement of 
the copyright.135
The significance of the Sony v. Universal City Studios136 case is that the Court had 
cognizance of the fact that new technologies offer the general public new and novel uses 
of copyrighted materials. Where these technologies pose a threat to the control, which 
copyright owners have over the manner which works are used, the Court recognized its 
limited role and ability in extending the scope of copyright protection without Congress 
explicitly legislating on the matter. This is a clear shift away from the decision of Kalem 
Company v. Harper Brothers,137 where the Supreme Court was keener then to include a 
new technology and a growing industry within the scope of the Copyright Act, primarily 
because of the economic potential and profits, which the motion pictures industry will 
make from the theatrical exhibitions of films.138 The VCR technology in Sony v. 
Universal City Studios139 on the other hand, was a technology that allowed its consumers 
130
 While nuances, perceptions and points of philosophy are understandable, the District Court did not think 
them to be always logical and certainly do not justify an injunction against the use of the VCR. The District 
Court felt that harm from time-shifting is speculative and minimal. 480 F. Supp. 429, 467 (1979)  
131
 464 U.S. 417, 454 (1984)
132
 For instance, using a VCR in a hospital setting to enable a patient to see programs he or she would 
otherwise miss has no productive purpose other than contributing to the psychological well-being of the 
patient. Virtually any time-shifting that increases viewer access to television programming may result in a 
comparable benefit. 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984)
133
 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984)
134
 The District Court made findings that the VCR could be used to record non-copyrighted materials or 
materials where its owners consent to the copying. The Supreme Court drew particular reference to 
testimonies that authorize some or all of their content to be copied. 464 U.S. 417, 445 (1984)
135
 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984)
136
 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
137
 222 U.S. 555 (1911)
138 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY 63-64 (Hill and Wang 1994)
139
 464 U.S. 417 (1984) 
23
to copy a copyrighted work and was not a technology that allowed the reproduction of the 
work in a different manner of expression.140 Adopting this line of reasoning, it may also 
be said that a dramatization of a novel in the form of a motion picture is an act that 
encroaches upon a separate market, which a novelist may wish to later explore and 
should therefore be unauthorized. The motion pictures production technology in Kalem 
Company v. Harper Bros.141 provided the opportunity for motion pictures producers to 
exploit a dramatization right that Congress intended for the copyright holder and the 
Supreme Court in that case recognized the opportunities, which the new technology 
provided a growing and thriving motion pictures industry.
Time-shifting of televised motion pictures for private consumption, on the other 
hand, was not a use of a technology that encroached upon a right, which Congress had 
intended for the copyright holder. Although it is possible to easily concede with Justice 
Blackmun in his dissenting opinion in Sony v. Universal City Studios,142 that the VCR 
technology allows home television users to infringe copyright by recording off-the-air, 
which is not only the foreseeable use of the VCR but also its intended use, and that Sony, 
the producer of the VCR ought to be liable for inducing and materially contributing to the 
infringing conduct of VCR owners,143 this line of reasoning is premised on the 
assumption that Congress had intended to provide a content owner control over the very 
right that Justice Blackmun speaks about – the right to time-shift televised motion 
pictures in the privacy of a consumer’s home. Justice Stevens in delivering the majority 
opinion of the Supreme Court however recognized that this may be a right that Congress 
did not intend for the copyright owner to have.144 Justice Stevens exercised caution by 
letting Congress take the lead in looking at the new technology as Congress had 
examined other innovations in the past. It was not the job of the courts, Justice Stevens 
reasoned, to apply laws that have not been written.145
In deference to Congress’ role to pass laws to extend copyright where new 
technologies emerge, the Supreme Court took a stance that the courts’ role in extending 
140
 The Supreme Court in Sony v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) distinguished Kalem 
Company v. Harper Brothers, 222 U.S. 555 (1911) on the basis that the producer in Kalem did not merely 
provide the “means” to accomplish an infringing activity; the producer supplied the work itself, albeit in a 
new medium of expression. Sony in the instant case does not supply VCR consumers with copyrighted 
works; the copyright owners do. Sony supplies a piece of equipment that is generally capable of copying 
the entire range of programs that may be televised: those that are copyrighted, those that are copyrighted 
but may be copied without objection from the copyright holder, and those that the copyright holder would 
prefer not to have copied. The VCR can be used to make authorized and unauthorized uses of copyrighted 
works, but the range of its potential use is much broader than the particular infringing use of the film Ben 
Hur involved in Kalem. 464 U.S. 417, 436-437 (1984) 
141
 222 U.S. 555 (1911)
142
 464 U.S. 417, 457 (1984) 
143
 464 U.S. 417, 490 (1984)
144
 According to Justice Stevens, “One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected 
representatives of the millions of people who watch television every day have made it unlawful to copy a 
program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat prohibition against the sale of machines that make 
such copying possible.” 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984)  
145
 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984)  
24
the rights of a copyright holder is limited, even when new technologies pose a threat to 
the right a copyright holder had in the work. The courts, in deciding the proper treatment 
to give technological advances, are always reluctant to extend copyright protection over 
new uses of content when a new technology is introduced, especially where the new 
technology allow home users the flexibility of using the content in the way they choose. 
In deciding whether community antenna television (CATV) systems, which receive, 
amplify and modulate signals from television stations and retransmit them to their 
subscriber television sets, infringed upon the performance right of a copyright owner, the 
Supreme Court had to once again address the implications a new technology posed to the 
existing industry.146 The Supreme Court felt that only broadcasters, such as television 
stations, were “performers” of a copyright owner’s content and falling within the purview 
of the copyright act, would be liable for unauthorized broadcasts of the work. Cable 
companies however, were mere viewers of content because such companies merely 
enhance other viewer’s ability to receive a broadcaster’s signals and therefore did not 
infringe upon the performance right of a copyright owner. Declining to allow copyright 
owners to control the flow of information in copyrighted works through new 
communications technology, the Supreme Court once again left it to Congress to legislate 
on the matter.147
The industries do have recourse to Congress to enact more specific rights in 
response to technological changes in the industry and obvious efforts have been made to 
lobby for stronger and longer copyright monopolies to control information flow in 
content.148 While Congress has responded to the changes brought about by sometimes 
enacting laws to allow for increasing control over copyrighted content,149 Congress may 
in effect enact laws, which prevent the free flow of information in copyrighted works and 
affect economic growth in the long-run.150 Furthermore, if copyright law is necessary to 
provide an incentive for the production of creative content,151 the enactment of stronger 
copyright laws really permit the industry to “leverage its control from an old world into 
the new” and provide the industries with a right to control technological development in a 
146
 Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 
147
 392 U.S. 390, 402 
148
 Conglomerates such as Disney Co. had lobbied extensively for the passing of the Copyright Term 
Extension Act. Ten out of thirteen sponsors in the House received contribution from Disney and eight of 
the twelve sponsors in the Senate were given money by Disney’s political action committee. Disney also 
made a donation of $20,000 to the National Republican Senatorial Committee two weeks after Senate 
Majority Leader Trent Lott signed the bill. See Christina N. Gifford, The Sony Bono Copyright Extension 
Act, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 363, 386 (2000)  
149
 It is said that “[t]he U.S. Congress sometimes greets the invention of a new technology as an occasion to 
fill up the cup of copyright with yet another legal right. Other times, it declines to bring a new market 
within the laws embrace.” PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY 37 (Hill and Wang 1994) 
150Professor Joseph Schumpeter argues that economic growth is a result of technological change or 
innovation. Joseph Schumpeter, The Instability of Capitalism, in THE ECONOMICS OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE (Nathan Rosenberg ed., Penguin Books, Ltd. 1971). See also, JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY 
OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AN INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST AND THE BUSINESS 
CYCLE 63-69 (Redvers Opie trans., Harvard University Press 1961) 
151
 It has been said that “[c]onventional wisdom tells us that, without the incentives provided by copyright, 
entrepreneurs will refuse to invest in new media. History tells us that they do invest without paying 
attention to conventional wisdom.” JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 173 (Prometheus Books 2001) 
25
new industry.152 More importantly however, is that as the pace of technological change 
quickens, Congress has become less and less able and willing to adjust copyright laws to 
these changes, especially where a “proposed imposition of copyright liability disrupts 
entrenched consumer habits.”153 The point made here is that, like the courts, Congress has 
a limited role to play in developing copyright laws to accommodate technological 
change.   
In A.M. Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,154 the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California took a remarkably different approach from the Supreme 
Court in the Sony v. Universal City Studios case. In this case, A.M. Records and 
seventeen other record companies filed a complaint for contributory and vicarious 
copyright infringement and unfair competition against Napster, Inc., an Internet start-up, 
which allowed its users to download MP3 music files for free. The Napster software 
technology featured a browser interface, search engine and chat functions and operated in 
conjunction with Napster’s online network of servers that allowed its users to compile 
and store lists of other account holders’ user names.155 The Napster software may also be 
used to play and categorize audio files, which users can store in specific file directories 
on their hard drives. These directories, which allow users to share files on Napster, 
constitute the “user library” and while some users store their files in these libraries, others 
do not.156 The peer-to-peer file sharing network connected millions of computers 
worldwide and allowed its software users to search for MP3 files containing digital music 
over the Internet,157 file share their music without having to go through a centralized 
server158 and find and chat with other MP3 users while using online Internet Relay Chat 
(hereinafter “IRC”).159 With the Napster code made freely available for download on the 
Internet, millions of Internet users began to share and trade music through the Internet. 
This caused alarm within the industry because the technology facilitated the distribution 
of copyrighted works in an unprecedented manner. 
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In defense to the claim of copyright infringement,160 Napster raised the defense of 
fair use. Napster also argued that the use of the Napster technology was of a substantial 
non-infringing use, as argued by the Supreme Court in Sony v. Universal City Studios.161
Going through the four pronged test for the finding of fair use, the Court decided that the 
use of Napster was for private use,162 that copyrighted musical compositions and sound 
recordings were creative in nature,163 that the downloading or uploading of the 
copyrighted work constituted a copying of the entire work164 and that the market for 
copyrighted works owned by the copyright owners was harmed by the use of Napster.165
The Court further dismissed any claims made by Napster, Inc. of potential fair uses of the 
Napster service – sampling of music, space-shifting of music and the authorized 
distribution of new artist’s work. According to the Court, the Napster service allowed its 
users to obtain permanent copies of songs that they would have otherwise had to purchase 
and carried with it the potential for “viral distribution to millions of people.”166 It is 
interesting to note that the Court distinguished Sony v. Universal City Studios167 from the 
present case on the basis that time-shifting of televised broadcasts in Sony allowed its 
viewers to watch a work that the copyright owner had made available to the home viewer 
free of charge, while the recording companies in the Napster case almost always charged 
consumers for the use of their music. The court reasoned that this is an infringement of 
the copyright for Napster to make music available in such a manner to its users.168
The Court’s decision to stretch copyright law to prevent the use of copyrighted 
works by users of Napster brings copyright law into a new dimension, where the law is 
now used to prevent the development of new markets,169 limit consumer choice as to the 
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available on Napster may have been copyrighted and more than seventy percent may have been owned and 
administered by the plaintiffs in the case. See id. at 911
161
 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
162
 The Court held that although the use of Napster was not for commercial purposes, the vast scale of 
Napster use amongst anonymous individuals in the downloading and uploading of MP3 files using Napster, 
showed that the uses were not private. A host user sending a file cannot be said to engage in a personal use 
when distributing that file to an anonymous requester. Moreover, the fact that Napster users got for free 
what they would have otherwise paid for suggests that they reap economic benefit from Napster use. 114 F. 
Supp. 2d 896, 912 (2000)  
163
 As these works are creative in nature, they constitute entertainment, which cuts against a finding of fair 
use. See id. at 913 
164 See id. at 913 
165
 This happens by reducing sales among college students and raises barriers to the copyright owner’s 
entry into the market for digital downloading of music. 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 913 (2000)
166 See id. at 913 
167
 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
168
 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 913 (2000)
169
 The plaintiffs in this case demonstrated by a substantial likelihood that it would adversely affect the 
potential market for their copyrighted works if the use of the Napster service became widespread. The 
plaintiffs claim three general types of harm – a decrease in retail sales, especially among college students; 
an obstacle to the plaintiff’s future entry into the digital downloading market; and a social devaluing of 
music stemming from its free distribution. 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 914 (2000)
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use of the work170 and prevent the displacement of sales171 in the present industry by the 
introduction of a new technology that changes the existing mechanism and workings of 
the industry.172 The process of technological change that is vital to the development and 
growth to any industry was therefore curtailed by the decision in A.M. Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc. 173 Judge Patel, in delivering the decision of the Court to grant an injunction 
against Napster to discontinue its services, was of the opinion that “the business interests 
of an infringer does not trump a right holder’s entitlement to copyright protection.” In 
dismissing the fact that the decision would destroy Napster’s user base and make its 
service technologically infeasible, the Court had effectively tilted the direction of 
technological development backward. Being of the opinion that the destruction of 
Napster, Inc. by the injunction was speculative compared to the massive damage caused 
by the unauthorized downloading and uploading of the plaintiff’s copyrighted works, 
Judge Patel had allowed the industry to control the course of information flow at the 
expense of cultural, technological and industrial development. The decision of the Court 
in Napster illustrates the control, which copyright owners have over the flow in 
copyrighted content through copyright law. 
The sound recording industry faces different challenges from other content 
industries, such as the motion pictures industry. Music files are more easily compressed 
and distributed because they are significantly smaller than motion pictures files.174 Users 
are also able to participate in the distribution of music content by “ripping”175 a song 
from a CD and posting it on the Internet.176 These are two salient reasons that make the 
170
 It was shown in the case that Napster users and not the record companies control the music selection and 
the amount and timing of the sampling activity. The users of Napster may also keep many songs after 
deciding not to purchase the entire CD. See id. at 914
171
 The Court rejected Napster’s report that said that space-shifting like time-shifting, leaves the value of 
the copyright unscathed because it does not displace sales. Instead, the Court accepted statistics provided 
by the copyright owners that use of Napster does indeed displace sales of music. The copyright owner’s 
report stated that approximately forty-nine percent of college-student survey respondents previously owned 
less than ten percent of the songs they downloaded and about sixty-nine percent owned less than a quarter. 
See id. at 916   
172
 The creation of a new distribution channel for consumer’s use of music had effectively created a gray 
market for music recording. It is said that gray markets are “the predicted outcome of any intellectual 
property system.” Here, in the Napster case, this point is clearly illustrated. See Shubha Ghosh, Turning 
Gray into Green: Some Comments on Napster, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 563, 566 (2001) 
173
 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (2000)
174
 With the MP3 file format, a music file can now be compressed into one-twelfths the amount of space as 
that of an uncompressed music file. Ryan S. Henriquez, Facing the Music on the Internet: Identifying 
Divergent Strategies for Different Segments of the Music Industry in Approaching Digital Distribution, 7 
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 57, 62 (1999)  
175
 Encoder or “ripper” software allows its users to “rip” songs out of CDs they own, upload the songs from 
the CD onto their computer’s hard drive, where the songs may then be encoded into MP3 file format and 
distributed through the Internet. Ripper software can be obtained for free or at very small cost. The Music 
Match’s Jukebox software product is available on the company’s website for $30.00 and this is an encoder, 
which is eight times faster than other encoders. There are other slower encoders that can be downloaded for 
free at various Internet website. See id. at 64 
176
 The posting of digital music on the Internet results from the diminishing cost of reproduction and 
distribution of music by the consumer’s ability to “rip” music out from a CD, make copies of the music and 
distribute it over the Internet. It is said that when the cost of reproducing a material approaches zero, 
consumers will begin to invest in the distribution of the material directly. In the case of Napster for 
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control of music distribution over the Internet a challenge for the sound recording 
industry. Digital media technology and the Internet have begun to empower recording 
artists and musicians by allowing them to produce and distribute their works. This paper 
addresses two aspects of the sound recording industry, which will affect the flow of 
information between the recording studio and the consuming public. The sound recording 
contract and the opportunities to connect directly with listeners of music on the Internet 
are two significant factors, which are causing independent sound recording artists and 
musicians to produce and distribute music to listeners without a sound recording studio. 
Artists Recording Contracts and the Sound Recordings Industry
One of the more fundamental aspects of the sound recording industry is the 
relationship between the recording studio and the artist. This relationship is significantly 
altered by the Internet and digital technologies, which offer artists an alternative from 
what is deemed to be an onerous relationship against artists’ interests. Traditional artists 
recording contracts are considered to be onerous especially when the contract is signed at 
the beginning of the artist’s career.177 The onerous terms in the contract are often justified 
on the premise that the recording company is taking a substantial risk with an artist that is 
yet unknown for there is no certainty if the recording company is going to recover the 
expenses spent on making a new artist popular or widely- known.178 Artists have been 
known to file for bankruptcy to escape the contractual provisions of the recording 
contract179 simply because the artist is not capable of meeting the terms of the recording 
contract despite increasing popularity.180 With the Internet and digital technologies 
example, the consuming public funded and created the distribution channel for digital music by the 
purchase of “computers, modems, storage media and Internet service.” Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers 
and Creative Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 539, 565-566 (2003)   
177
 This is because record companies know that the bargaining position of an artist is weakest at the 
beginning of the artist’s career. The bargaining power however shifts to the artist when the artist begins to 
sell platinum albums. Lynn Morrow, The Recording Artist Agreement: Does it Empower or Enslave?, 3 
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 40, 43 (2001) 
178
 Nicholas Baumgartner, The Balance Between Recording Artists and Record Companies: A Tip in Favor 
of the Artists?, 5 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 73, 76 (2003) (arguing that since late 2000, recording contracts 
may be tipping in favor of the recording artist by two changes in the law. The first is the removal of sound 
recordings from the category of “works made for hire,” which would allow an artist to be the owner of the 
copyright as an employee of the recording company and not as an independent contractor, contracted by the 
recording company to perform the sound recording. Second is the exception to California’s seven year 
statute that allows artist recording contracts to be enforced after seven years and the lobbying efforts to 
change the law to allow an artist, who is negotiating a contract for the first time to be bound to the contract 
for a maximum period of seven years, regardless of the terms of the contract) 
179
 Rita C. Letowsky, Broke or Exploited: The Real Reason behind Artists Bankruptcies, 20 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L. J. 625. According to Letowsky, record companies advance funds to artists in order to 
produce an album and permit the artist to maintain a particular lifestyle. These advancements, which range 
from $175,000 to $350,000, with advancements to superstars exceeding one million dollars, must be repaid 
to the recording company by the artist despite the fact that the cost of producing an album is so excessive 
that the artist retains very little or no money from royalty income on the sale of a record for personal use. 
180
 An artist’s financial difficulties are attributed to the lack of business savvy and foresight when signing 
the recording contract and receiving advancements from the recording companies, personal overspending, 
high taxes on 40% of their income and the payment of a portion of their income to lawyers, managers, 
producers and booking agents. The compensation package for the artist requiring the artist to repay the 
recording company for “recording expenses, packaging costs, promotional copies of records for radio 
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however, artists do have greater leverage power in negotiating these recording contracts, 
as artists may now be able to sign on with independent record labels.181 Independent 
record labels are not affiliated with a major record company and use the Internet and 
digital technologies as a primary marketing, promotion and distribution channel for the 
new artist. The signing of a record deal with a major recording company may no longer 
be “crucial” to developing an artist’s potential and to reaping the rewards that fame may 
bring.182 The possibilities of marketing, promotion and distribution through channels 
opened up by the Internet and new technologies require the sound recordings industry to 
rethink contractual provisions that may no longer be relevant to an artist, who is looking 
at the Internet and digital technologies as an alternative path to audience popularity and 
musical success. The Eagles, one of the most successful rock bands in American music 
history,183 for example, has released their new single, “Hole in the World” under their 
own Eagles Recording Company IT Label and will release their new studio album 
themselves despite offers from a few major record labels.184 Folk singer Natalie Merchant 
has also started her own record label, Mythic America, and has released her new solo 
album, “The House Carpenter’s Daughter” through her website and selected retailers, 
after obtaining release from Elektra Records, a division of AOL-Time Warner.185 The 
rock band Pearl Jam has also freed itself from a decade-long contract with Epic Records, 
a division of Sony Music, to build an “Internet-based-direct-distribution arrangement that 
allow fans to buy recordings of live performances following each show.”186
stations and retail stores, records given to distributors as an incentive to purchase, portions of marketing 
and radio promotions and anticipated returned copies” as well as cross-collateralization of  proceeds from a 
subsequent successful album to recoup any losses the record label experienced on the artist’s earlier 
albums, contribute to the artist’s difficulties in making enough from the royalty income to repay the 
recording company for the advancement made to them. David C. Norrell, The Strong Get Stronger: Record 
Labels Benefit from Proposed Changes to the Bankruptcy Code, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 445, 454-456 
(1999) 
181
 Independent record labels distribute their records through independent distributors, which are 
distributors that are not affiliated with a major. Independent record labels promote more “specialized” 
genres of music such as street music and folk music because of the relatively smaller size of these markets 
that do not get the major record companies’ attention and the connection that these independent record 
companies have with smaller retailers, who cater to more specialized music genres. DONALD PASSMAN, 
ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 85-86 (Simon & Schuster 2000) (1991)
182
 Lynn Morrow, The Recording Artist Agreement: Does it Empower or Enslave? 3 VAND. J. ENT. L. & 
PRAC. 40, 40-41 (2001) 
183
 The band has a worldwide album sale of 120 million and their first greatest-hits set is the biggest selling 
album of all times, with more than 28 million copies sold in the United States alone.  Artists Turn Tables on 
the Major Labels by Going Indie, DENV. POST, Jul. 13, 2003, at F01, available at 2003 WL 5517257 
184 Artists Turn Tables on the Major Labels by Going Indie, DENV. POST, Jul. 13, 2003, at F01, available at
2003 WL 5517257
185 See id.
186
 Pearl Jam guitarist Stone Gossard had said, “If you like the show, you can get a pretty high quality 
recording … We spent a lot of time working out the details of how we could do it quickly. It’s so easy and 
cheap to record now because of the digital technology that’s available. Because of DSL lines, we can send 
shows back to Seattle for mastering and then to the manufacturing plant in a 24-hour period. We have 
boxes of CDs a week later. It’s amazing.” See id.
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There are several terms of the recording contract, which may not be applicable 
where music is sold independently though the Internet.187 The packaging charge or 
packaging deduction clause188 has no application on the Internet as digital downloads of 
music content will not have to be packaged in the manner as it is conventionally 
understood in the artist recording contract.189 Free goods provisions in the recording 
contract that allow the recording company to give away free copies of the record190
should be revised to accommodate the distribution of music content through the 
Internet.191 Promotional copies of records given away by the recording company for 
promotion, such as radio-station copies for air-play and record stores copies for in-store 
listening,192 are likely to have no application to digitally distributed music content on the 
Internet.193 The distribution of music content through the Internet may also render 
187
 Ryan S. Henriquez, Facing the Music on the Internet: Identifying Divergent Strategies for Different 
Segments of the Music Industry in Approaching Digital Distribution, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 57, 112-118 
(1999). 
188 DONALD PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 90-91 (Simon & Schuster 
2000). According to Passman, “In theory, this is the cost of the “package,” and it’s deducted because the 
artist should get a royalty only on the record, not the package. In reality it’s a charge of much more than 
any package actually costs, and is thus an artificial way to reduce the artist’s royalty.”   
189
 Ryan S. Henriquez, Facing the Music on the Internet: Identifying Divergent Strategies for Different 
Segments of the Music Industry in Approaching Digital Distribution, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 57, 113 (1999). 
According to Henriquez, “the packaging charge already represents an inflated representation of what the 
packaging actually costs the record company. In addition, the packaging charge will be reduced to zero 
with digital downloads, as the download does not require packaging, it is simply transmitted to a paying 
online consumer’s hard drive. Artists should recognize this discrepancy and ensure that the royalty base for 
digital download is not artificially diminished by the “packaging charge,” which has no application in the 
realm of digitally downloaded albums.”
190
 Free goods provisions in recording contracts allowed a recording company to give away free records and 
are a mechanism used by the record company to lessen royalty dues owed to the artist. A record company 
could sell one hundred records for $0.85 each or eighty-five records for $1.00 each and giving the retailer 
15 free records for every hundred that is purchased. In both scenarios, the recording company gets paid 
$85.00 for the sale of 100 record copies to the retailer. However, the recording artist is paid royalties only 
on the copies of the records sold and would therefore be paid royalties only on eighty-five copies of the 
record. Furthermore, the artist is paid royalties on an approximation of the price received by the retailer (the 
retail price) and not the wholesale price received by the recording company, thus not being entitled to any 
inflation on the wholesale price. DONALD PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC 
BUSINESS 90-92 (Simon & Schuster 2000) 
191
 Where music content is distributed digitally through the Internet, “record companies can provide online 
megastores and other online retailers with a single template file from which to copy and transmit requested 
songs” and “by negotiating the removal of this outmoded contractual provision with regards to digital 
downloads, artists can further guarantee their royalties accurately reflect the precise number of albums that 
are actually sold.” Ryan S. Henriquez, Facing the Music on the Internet: Identifying Divergent Strategies 
for Different Segments of the Music Industry in Approaching Digital Distribution, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV.
57, 114 (1999)   
192
 Promotional copies are marked “not for sale” but are sometimes sold in record stores for a lesser price. 
DONALD PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 94-95 (Simon & Schuster 
2000) 
193
 With digital distribution of music content, promotional copies of records may be issued by the record 
companies but “without accruing costs to the artists that must be recouped.” Artists will “be able to ensure 
costs associated with producing and distributing the promotional copies will not be used to balloon their 
unrecouped account with the record company.” Ryan S. Henriquez, Facing the Music on the Internet: 
Identifying Divergent Strategies for Different Segments of the Music Industry in Approaching Digital 
Distribution, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 57, 114-115 (1999)
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“reserves against returns” clauses that allow a record company to withhold royalty 
payments to the artist until it is certain that the sale to the retailer is final194 and 
“breakage” clauses that reduce an artist’s royalty by any losses incurred due to a breakage 
of records during shipment,195 obsolete and no longer applicable for Internet and digital 
sale of music content. A revision of the recording contract is important because it defines 
the relationship between the recording artist and the recording company. If the “sole 
purpose of a record company is to sell records,” and the recording artist is the “record 
company’s most valuable asset,”196 the opportunities presented by the Internet and digital 
media technologies enable the artist to create another flow of content from the artists to 
the user of music by independently producing and distributing music without a sound 
recording company.   
While it used to be that the recording company chooses the artist it wishes to 
bring to stardom, artists today have a greater leverage against the recording company, 
which they did not use to have until they reached immense popularity with music fans. It 
may be argued that “without the money, marketing and distribution of an established 
record company, it is extremely unlikely that an artist will break through the cluttered 
market and reach the level of success necessary to sustain a career, much less to become 
a superstar”197 and it is indeed acceptable that the recording company is still an integral 
component to an artist’s path to stardom. However, it is submitted in this paper that the 
practices of the recording companies are sufficiently onerous on the artist that an artist 
194
 The company sells records on a 100% return privilege. This allows the retailer to return unsold records 
back to the recording company. Record companies are often uncertain about the number of records a 
retailer will successfully sell, especially with a new artist, and would include a provision in the recording 
contract to withhold a portion of royalty payment to the artist until it is certain that the sale to the retailer is 
final. DONALD PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 95-96 (Simon & Schuster 
2000). Sales of music content to consumers online reduces the chance for a return of digital downloads and 
the license of a digital template to an online music distributor that allows copies of digital music content to 
be made for each purchase by a consumer eliminates the need for a “reserves against returns” clause. Ryan 
S. Henriquez, Facing the Music on the Internet: Identifying Divergent Strategies for Different Segments of 
the Music Industry in Approaching Digital Distribution, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 57, 115 (1999)
195
 Breakage clauses arose when records were made of vinyl and shellac and were highly breakable. 
Recording companies developed breakage clauses to pay an artist only 90% of the shipment and withhold 
10% to cover their breakage. This practice of paying only 90% of net sales is retained even though “records 
haven’t been made of shellac for the last sixty years.” DONALD PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW
ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 97 (Simon & Schuster 2000). It would be difficult to make this clause 
applicable for music content that is distributed digitally because “digital downloads are not “shipped” in a 
fashion that could result in breakage, they are digitally transmitted through modems and wires.” Where a 
digital distribution fails, “the download can simply be recopied and sent from the template, without 
incurring any cost for breakage.” Ryan S. Henriquez, Facing the Music on the Internet: Identifying 
Divergent Strategies for Different Segments of the Music Industry in Approaching Digital Distribution,  7 
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 57, 116 (1999)
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 Lynn Morrow, The Recording Artist Agreement, Does it Empower or Enslave?, 3 VAND. J. ENT. L. & 
PRAC. 40, 41 (2001). Morrow argues that “despite new technology which allows the artist to go directly to 
the consumer and eliminate the major record company as a middleman, a record deal with a major label 
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197 See id. at 51. 
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seeking an alternative path to success or whose perception of success involves the 
distribution of his or her own creative music without a recording company’s constraints, 
would inevitably see the Internet and digital technologies as an opportune channel for 
creative musical expression. With the ability of music to create a culture in itself, it is 
submitted that the Internet and digital technologies presents the perfect environment for 
the creation of new genres of music that breaks away from mainstream popular music. 
Today, the possibility of recording artists collectively boycotting recording contracts with 
major record labels and distributing their content through the Internet digitally is not 
inconceivable if sound recordings companies are not willing to change the balance of the 
recording company-recording artist contractual relationship.198
The recording companies are taking steps in this direction to rebalance the 
contractual relationship with recording artists. BMG, one of the largest music publishing 
companies,199 is the first recording company to break away from conventional recording 
contracts by removing deduction clauses from the contract and agreeing to pay artists a 
standard rate for music content sold in any format,200 paying royalty for net income from 
licenses of music content to third parties201 and limiting new contracts to the production 
and sale of one album with the option of extending the contract to three more albums.202
The new contract also has more equitable terms with the introduction of a fixed level of 
studio recording costs for each album for which artists will not be charged for and the 
decision to pay advances to artists on a monthly basis throughout the duration of the 
contract ensures that recording artists become more responsible for their financial 
budgets.203 At the same time, Universal Music Group, a leading music company, whose 
global operations encompass the development, manufacture, marketing, sales and 
distribution of recorded music,204 and Warner Brothers Records205 are considering 
198
 Artists have started to show their anger for recording companies by changing their stage name (Prince, a 
popular recording artist, changed his name to an unpronounceable signed and performed with the word 
“slave” written on his face as an act of revenge against Warner Brothers Records), bringing their recording 
company to court (George Michael, brought Sony Records to court in 1994 for making him a “pop slave” 
although he has signed another recording contract with Sony since November 2003) and lobbying for better 
rights for artist through the Recording Artists Coalition. Steve Hemsley, A Burst of Harmony: A New Style 
of Contract May Signal the End of Mistrust between Artists and their Record Labels, FIN. TIMES, Jan 20, 
2004, at 14, available at 2004 WL 56799797
199
 For more information about BMG, refer to the company’s official website at www.bmg.com
200
 The standard royalty rate for new BMG recording contracts is 15% of the local dealer price received by 
the company in any country. See Steve Hemsley, A Burst of Harmony: A New Style of Contract May Signal 
the End of Mistrust between Artists and their Record Labels, FIN. TIMES, Jan 20, 2004, at 14, available at
2004 WL 56799797
201
 The royalty rate is 50% of the net income generated from the license of music content to third parties 
such as for compilations and films and advertising synchronization work. See id.
202
 Major record companies usually demand for the production of five to six albums. BMG’s new contract 
allows artists to renegotiate their contracts much earlier than before. See id.
203
 The new contract also provide for additional advances to retain the copyright in an artist’s master 
recording (the original tape recording made in the recording studio) for the duration of the contract and for 
five years after the contract ends. After that the recording company must pay the artist another advance 
based on recent sales performance or release the masters. See id.
204
 For more information about Universal Music Group, refer to the company’s official website at 
http://new.umusic.com/flash.aspx
205
 For more information about Warner Brothers Records, refer to the company’s official website at 
http://www.warnerbrosrecords.com/
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offering better royalty rates to their artists for digital downloads.206 It is submitted that the 
revision of contractual terms in the standard recording contract by recording companies is 
appropriate especially where the traditional methods of commercializing music content 
are undergoing transformation due to the opportunities that the Internet and digital 
technologies offer artists today. Nonetheless, it is difficult to believe that in the long run, 
traditional artist-recording company relationships will persist to exist as it does now. 
Popular Internet sites such as Garage Band207 and CD Baby208 offer independent artists 
the ability to sell their music content independently and have found considerable and 
notable successes, giving artists a very real and tangible option to market, promote and 
sell their music content directly to the consumer without reliance on a record label. 
Furthermore, these Internet sites extend their services to the music consumer that go 
beyond the distribution of a packaged set of music that the recording company believes to 
be the kind of music the consumer would want to receive. 
The purchase of individual singles through digital downloads without being 
bundled is becoming more common after recording companies realized their consumers’ 
value for autonomy in their consumption of music and announced to the media that they 
no longer want the lack of content to drive consumer usage of peer-to-peer networks.209
With hindsight after peer-to-peer file sharing of music content through the Internet took 
unprecedented heights when Napster’s popularity was at its peak, it appears that 
recording companies are reconsidering their manner of music content distribution over 
the Internet. The five major record labels – Sony Music Entertainment, EMI Recorded 
Music, Warner Music Group, BMG and Universal Music Group – have begun to provide 
better services, which music fans are willing to pay for. This includes allowing music 
content to be downloaded through the Internet from online music services such as 
Apple’s iTunes,210 which feature tracks from all five major record labels.211 Some 
recording artists are reluctant to license their recordings for digital download through the 
Internet because of concerns with the piracy of music content, the low rate of current 
206See Steve Hemsley, A Burst of Harmony: A New Style of Contract May Signal the End of Mistrust 
between Artists and their Record Labels, FIN. TIMES, Jan 20, 2004, at 14, available at 2004 WL 56799797
207
 Garage Band’s mission is to “empower musicians and to discover the best independent music.” The site 
is intended to be “the best place for rising musicians to get feedback and exposure, exchange ideas, find 
new fans and further their careers.” The site also has long term ambitions to change the way music is 
discovered and promoted and intends to bring music to consumers at lower costs and allow musicians to 
retain more control of their careers. For more information about the site, refer to 
http://www.garageband.com
208
 CD Baby is an online record store that sells CDs by independent musicians. The company has been in 
business and has been thriving since March 1998 and is the largest seller of independent CDs on the web. 
The site has sold over $10 million in independent CDs from 1998 to February 2004. For more information 
about CD Baby, refer to http://www.cdbaby.com/
209
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2003, available at 2003 WL10158268  
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 Apple’s iTunes is an online music store that stores hundreds of thousands of songs and allows its users 
to browse, search, preview, buy and download music. With 25 million AOL members, who can now enjoy 
instant one-click access to the iTunes Music Store for Windows and Mac, iTunes is said to be “the world’s 
best digital jukebox.” For more information on iTunes, see http://www.apple.com/itunes/overview.html
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licensing fees or to protect their catalogue by holding it back until demand is higher.212
Although the Internet and digital technologies do not present a Utopia for the online 
marketing, promotion and distribution of music content, these technologies have 
permeated the industry and its consumer base to such an extent that the structure of the 
industry is permanently altered. The values of music consumers, the very relationship 
between technology and copyright law and the nature of music itself are compelling 
factors that are impelling a changing trend within the industry. An increasing number of 
artists are turning to the Internet and digital technologies to market, promote and 
distribute their music and it may be argued that a completely new music culture is in the 
process of formation with the way the Internet and digital technologies have affected and 
are affecting the consumer’s experience of music. This paper addresses this point next. 
The Recording Artist and New Technologies
An increasing number of recording artists are turning to the Internet and digital 
technologies to market, promote and distribute their music content and it may be seen 
that these new technologies are providing the artist with a certain degree of autonomy for 
the creative expression of their individual music style. New artists have now begun to 
rely on the Internet and digital technologies as well as their own talent to provide them 
with the public exposure to ensure that their music is heard and sold.213 The evolution of 
music production, promotion and distribution from being record label centric to the more 
diffused technological environment of the Internet has a profound impact on the 
traditional method of commercializing music content whereby a single successful artist 
compensates for all other investments a record company makes in producing, promoting 
and distributing the music of other artists.214 This business model, which has been 
aggressively used to justify the imposition of high CD prices, the enactment of stronger 
copyright laws and the strict enforcement of copyright laws against pirates by the sound 
recordings industry,215 may now become peripheral as new artists embrace the 
possibilities that the Internet offer by producing, marketing, promoting and distributing 
their own music without depending on a traditional record label to create the necessary 
public exposure for the successful commercialization of their creative work. 
212
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 As in Hollywood, where a few stars make multimillions while the average actor barely makes out a 
living, the record business has increasingly become a “winner-takes-all” industry. Out of 30,000 artists, 
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The proliferation of Internet sites promoting independent artists and providing a 
channel for the artist to reach out to a large consumer base is creating a new genre of 
music, which appeals to consumers and listeners of music. Structurally, the Internet is 
poised to deliver music content to a sufficiently large number of music listeners that there 
may be a shift in consumer preference for particular genres of music that were 
conventionally not carried by record labels. In the 1940s, radio listeners developed a taste 
for less contemporary music when radio broadcasters started broadcasting music from 
Broadcast Music, Inc.’s (BMI) catalogue of music as their signal of rejection of the 
higher licensing fees that were being imposed by the American Society of Composers, 
Authors and Publishers (ASCAP). As a result of the radio stations’ refusal to broadcast 
the more contemporary sound recordings licensed by ASCAP and their opting to 
broadcast “hillbilly” and “race” music on BMI’s catalogue instead, country music and 
black music, which originated from music that was regarded less esteemed than the music 
of George Gershwin, Jerome Kern, Cole Porter, Rodgers and Hart and all of the most 
popular music from Hollywood films and Broadway plays that were on ASCAP’s music 
catalogue, are today popular music genres in their own right.216 The same occurrence 
may be seen to be happening today as an increasing number of artists turn to the Internet 
and digital technologies to promote their music and distribute their own music without 
the backing of a major record label. This movement of recording artists away from a 
major record label’s more conventional packaging of their image towards a more 
personal delivery of an authentic and creative expression of individual music may pave 
the way for the consumer’s appreciation for a new genre of music that major record 
labels had previously dismissed. Independent recording artists utilizing the Internet to 
market, promote and distribute their work have the freedom to create their own music, 
develop their own talent and deliver their authentic individual music style to the 
consumer and this has appealed to many consumers of music. Clay Aiken and Ruben 
Studdard, who were winners of the hit television series “American Idol,”217 have 
developed successful music recordings without the backing of a major record label, 
primarily because their individual music style had appealed to a general music 
audience.218
The major record labels have been in a position to exert a great degree of control 
over the sound recording industry, its recording artists and its consumers through its 
various business models and industrial structures. This has been done through various 
216 JOHN RYAN, THE PRODUCTION OF CULTURE IN THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 1 (University Press of America, 
Inc. 1985)  
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methods, such as the onerous terms of the artists recording contract, the sale of music in a 
bundle, requiring the consumer to purchase an entire CD to obtain a single track, the 
production of music that appeals to general contemporary tastes and the strict 
enforcement of copyright laws against technology developers and consumers. These 
controls, exerted by the industry have alienated major record labels within the music 
industry219 and may be said to be akin to the controls that ASCAP exerted over the public 
performance of popular music in hotels, restaurants, motion picture and commercial radio 
broadcasts through their licensing agreements220 from the period between 1914, when 
ASCAP was established, to the end of 1939, when BMI was established.221 Creative 
artists, such as music publishers, composers and writers, had also begun to rely on 
ASCAP to help them make a living as social and economic circumstances changed by 
making ASCAP membership a necessary condition for success within the industry.222
ASCAP then went on to develop internal membership structures to control their 
members223 as well as maintain certain membership policies, which excluded artists 
within particular genres of music,224 in ways that are not very different from the practices 
219 Music Companies May Soon Be Able to Stop Worrying About Piracy on the Internet. Instead, They Will 
Need to Start Worrying About What They Are For, THE ECONOMIST (U.S. EDITION), May 8,1999. This 
article states that, “In this new era, the record companies have a further disadvantage: everybody dislikes 
them. Artists dislike them because they think the record companies rip them off. Consumers dislike them 
because the artists dislike them. Because Internet businesses are increasingly about building a community 
of loyal users, record companies must learn to be loved if they are to flourish like booksellers rather than go 
the way of the circulating library.” (The booksellers in London had feared that circulating libraries, which 
specialized in books-for-hire, will diminish the sales of books when these libraries first opened in England 
in the 1720s. With the Internet however, bookselling still thrives and flourishes online whereas circulating 
libraries are now “gone”) 
220
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of the present major record labels towards recording artists, who sign a recording contract
with them as well as recording artists, whose music is dismissed or ignored by the major 
record labels for belonging to a less contemporary genre of music.  
This is particularly relevant in thinking about the commercialization of music 
content with the use of the Internet and digital technologies today because the willingness 
of major record labels to sign recording contracts with certain types of artists while 
excluding certain other music genres, such as “garage band” music, from their record 
labels, has the effect of segregating the music market. This creates an environment 
whereby independent record labels or artists bearing their own record label are driven to 
market, promote and distribute their music through different business models and with 
the far reaching effects of the structure of the Internet and digital technologies, it is not 
very difficult to imagine the growth of a consumer base for non-mainstream music that is 
conventionally marketed, promoted and distributed by major labels. It may also be 
envisaged that independent record or artist labels carrying new genres of music may 
reach a far wider audience through their more flexible business models225 to create 
greater product diversity within the music industry by competing with major record labels 
in a way that parallels BMI’s entry into the music industry in the 1940s in competition 
with ASCAP and the resulting increase in the number of music publishers and writers in 
the music market place with access to performance rights income as well as the greater 
diversity in popular music. If the period from 1938 to 1941 is regarded as “one of the 
most critical in the history of the music industry” because this was when “forces within 
the industry, which had been building for years, finally resulted in intense conflict 
between ASCAP and the broadcasting industry,”226 this part of the paper presents that the 
music industry is at present at another critical point, where independent music is likely to 
proliferate through the Internet to penetrate the music consumer base, which major record 
labels had been in control of from as early as 1985227 and whilst radio broadcasting 
technology was the propelling force in the 1940s to produce a breakaway from ASCAP’s 
control of the music industry, Internet and digital media technologies are the propelling 
force in today’s music industry. 
and rural blacks,” for whom “hillbilly” music was intended and “the larger body of rural and urban blacks –
the market for blues, gospel and “authentic” jazz – the so called “race” music.” ASCAP’s policies both 
reflected and promoted this market segmentation which was segregated in terms of types of music, 
performers, radio stations, record labels and retail outlets. See id. at 56-71      
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The emergence of various Internet sites such as MusicDistribution.com228 to assist 
independent recording artists to obtain exposure with consumers of music, provide 
independent artists with artistic control over their own creative work and allow artists to 
generate income from their music though the promotion, distribution and sale of their 
music over the Internet by the provision of online music distribution services. CD 
Baby,229 which was started in 1997 by Derek Sivers, an independent musician himself, is 
an online record store that has emerged as the second largest seller of independent CDs 
over the Internet after Amazon.com.230 CD Baby has sold 826,289 CDs over the Internet 
and has paid $6,662,797 to independent artists, who have sold their CDs on CD Baby. As 
many as 57,120 artists sell their music over the Internet through CD Baby. CD Baby also 
assists independent artists distribute their music through digital downloading services 
provided by Apple’s iTunes and Listen.com’s Rhapsody231 services by digitally encoding 
music from an independent artist’s CD at the artist’s request and submitting it the to 
iTunes and Rhapsody online stores. 
GarageBand provides another channel for an aspiring artist to make his or her 
work known to an online music community by offering exposure to unsigned or amateur 
musicians through the posting of their music on their website to obtain feedback from 
other musicians while allowing new artists the opportunity to listen to music of other 
independent artists. GarageBand provides artists, who post their music on their website “a 
chance to discover what others are doing with their studio time.”232 More importantly 
however, GarageBand has entered several partnerships with radio stations and webcasters 
to play music of artists who have posted music on their site and gotten high listener 
reviews. Many radio stations recognize GarageBand as the best source for new songs for 
emerging artists and agreeing to add music from the site to their playlists. With the site’s 
massive database of songs, it is able to offer each radio station and webcaster music, 
which is tailored to the individual radio station’s or webcaster’s criteria. This provides 
artists a new venue for the promotion of their music, offers radio stations and webcasters 
228
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music free from public performance and digital performance royalties and gives music 
consumers more diversity in their range of music.233
The commercialization of music through the Internet and digital technologies by 
independent artists has produced a new culture in the public consumption of music as 
well as in the commercialization of music. As black and country artists began to receive 
public performance royalties from the radio broadcasts of their work after the 
establishment of BMI in the music market, independent artists today are able to obtain 
royalties from the digital download of their music through the Internet and through the 
newer business models that independent record labels have developed for online 
marketing, promotion and distribution of music content. It is foreseeable that independent 
music carried by independent labels through the Internet today will produce a diversified 
music market that caters to a wide array of music preferences. Creative musical 
expression will be permanently changed as more independent artists reach out to the 
consumer of music through the Internet. While the consumer culture that developed a 
preference for black and country music grew as a result of the competition between 
ASCAP and BMI for scarce resources of music for radio broadcasts,234 the present 
culture for other forms of music that reflect an artist’s individual music style is a result of 
an abundance of creative talents that have had no channels for expression and distribution 
with the prior business models adopted by the major record labels. 
With Internet and digital technologies, the commercialization of sound recordings 
is unlikely to return to the way it was before. Family-values music, for example, may 
develop as a new genre with MusicDistribution.com’s FaveStreet service and 
GarageBand’s artists may find greater satisfaction with a site that allows direct 
interaction with other musicians and music listeners, who may appreciate and honestly 
comment on their music than sign a recording contract with a major record label, which 
may restrict their creative artistic style.235 As with the impact of BMI’s entry into the 
music market, which was not immediately evident,236 it is submitted that the collective 
impact of recording artists utilizing Internet and digital media technologies to market, 
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promote and distribute their work, independent record labels channeling new music 
through the radio stations and webcasters and the general consumer receptiveness for new 
forms of music will have a profound impact on the sound recording industry. Although 
this is not evident now, the impact of recording artists utilizing new technologies to 
commercialize music content will emerge eventually as deep-rooted changes to the 
present state of the sound recording industry. As information flow in copyrighted content 
is enhanced by the Internet and digital media technologies and as more users become 
aware of their ability to affect the flow of information in content through the use of such
technologies, there will be a need to draw a clear balance between the rights of the author 
to control the use of works and the rights of the public to have access to the works for 
developmental and transformative purposes. Several mechanisms in copyright law serve 
this purpose and these mechanisms are addressed in Part 3 of this paper.
Part 3: The Private Interest – Public Interest Balance 
In the United States, copyright laws are enacted under the Copyright Clause of the 
United States Constitution, which grants Congress the power to “promote the progress of 
science and the useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the 
exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries.”237 Under the United States 
copyright regime, the author is placed as the primary recipient of copyright protection for 
literary and creative works. In order that a creative work be protected under copyright 
law, the requirement that the work be an original expression of authorship must be met. 
In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,238 an action was brought for the 
infringement of copyright in a photograph. It was argued that a photograph was not a 
writing nor the production of the author and was therefore not eligible for copyright 
protection under the constitutional clause. The Supreme Court decided that the terms 
“writings” and “authors” are “susceptible to a more enlarged definition”239 than an author 
and a written book. An author, according to the Supreme Court, is “he to whom anything 
owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or literature.”240
An author therefore is a person to whom a creative work owes its existence. The Supreme 
Court in Goldstein v. California241 further elaborated that the terms “writings” and 
“authors” in the constitutional clause have not been construed narrowly in their literal 
sense but rather with the “reach necessary to reflect the broad scope of constitutional 
principles.”242 The Supreme Court went on to state that “while an “author” may be 
viewed as an individual who writes an original composition, the term in its constitutional 
sense have been construed to mean an “originator,” “he to whom everything owes its 
origins.”243 It may be seen that central to the concept of an author is the notion that there
is not only the production of a creative work but also the element of originality. The 
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Supreme Court in Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.244 elaborates 
this point more clearly when it decided that factual compilations, such as a telephone 
directory consisting of white pages did not qualify for copyright protection because 
compilation of facts failed to meet the originality requirement of the constitutional clause. 
The Court stated, “the originality requirement … remains the touchstone of copyright 
protection today”245 and based its decision on this “bedrock principle of copyright”246 that 
“no one may claim originality as to facts”247 because “facts do not owe their origin to an 
act of authorship.”248
The emphasis on originality as a qualification for copyright protection creates a 
division between the private rights of an author as the originator of the creative work and 
the general public interest to have access to the work.249 The balance that copyright law 
seeks to achieve is fundamentally a balance between private property rights of authors 
and rights of the public within the public domain. There are difficulties in drawing a fair 
balance between both interests and the difficulties become evident in the judiciary’s 
application of the various copyright doctrines. The idea-expression dichotomy for 
example, exists to ensure that only creative expressions of authors are protected under the 
law, leaving ideas, “the building blocks of creativity”250 freely available for the public’s 
use.251 The demarcation is however not an easy one to draw and Judge Hand in Peter Pan 
Fabrics Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.252 alluded to this difficulty by stating that “obviously 
no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the ‘idea,’ and 
has borrowed the ‘expression.’ Decisions must inevitably be ad hoc.”253 Judge Hand 
elaborates the point further in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,254 where the District 
Court for the Southern District of New York had to decide if a subsequent motion picture 
with the same underlying story line infringed an earlier play.255 The other copyright 
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doctrine that attempts to draw a fair balance between private property rights and the 
public interests is the fair use doctrine that allows the use of copyrighted materials “if it is 
done for a salutary purpose,”256 such as “news reporting, teaching, criticism.”257 In Time, 
Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates,258 the use of copyrighted photographs of President John 
F. Kennedy’s assassination in a book written about the assassination was held to be a fair 
use of the copyrighted material. Although photographs were protected under the 
copyright act as a copyrightable subject matter, the District Court for the S.D. New York 
held that the “public interest in having the fullest information available on the murder of 
President Kennedy”259 prevailed over the private property rights of the copyright owner 
in the photographs.            
The balance to be drawn between private property rights and the public interest is 
the central issue in current copyright debates that pertain to the development of new 
technologies in the market place that shift the traditional boundaries between private 
property and public interests set by the analog world. Where “the principal content 
industries – publishing, sound recording, film and television industries – formed, 
developed and thrived around analog technology platforms in part because they 
inherently impeded unauthorized reproduction and distribution of works of 
authorship,”260 the content industries today are faced with the prospect of 
commercializing their content in a digitized environment that “has afforded consumers 
unprecedented power to access, store, manipulate, reproduce and distribute entertainment 
content,”261 which as a result has caused the industries to undergo a loss of control over 
their content. This balance between private property interests and the public interest is not 
an easy one to draw and the “law’s divide between private property and the public 
domain”262 constantly “shifts not only with the views of particular judges but also with 
national boundaries and with cultural attitudes.”263
The difficulty in drawing a fair balance between both the private and public 
interests is that American copyright jurisprudence is based on two separate and distinct 
ideologies about the protection that is due to the author of creative works. The school of 
thought that is based on principles of natural justice argues that authors should be given 
their dues for the production of creative works and that copyright protection should be 
extended where and when an author would be entitled to reap the rewards from the 
production of a creative work. The other school of thought is based on an incentive 
theory, which is that an author should only be given rights to the extent that it provides an 
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author with the economic incentive to produce creative works and any grant of rights that 
exceed the incentive of an author to create would be regarded as “an encroachment on the 
general freedom of everyone to write and say what they please.”264 The different schools 
of thought have been labeled differently in the academic literature to illustrate the same 
point. The natural rights school of thought has been labeled “a theory of moral 
deserts,”265 “the copyright optimists”266 or “the neoclassicist approach”267 and the other 
school of thought as “expressed in terms of economic incentives,”268 the “copyright 
pessimists”269 or “the minimalist position.”270 Although both these school of thoughts 
differ as to the scope to which copyright protection should be granted to authors of 
creative works, both do agree that there is a necessity for there to be enough protection to 
encourage authors to produce creative works.271 Arguments to strengthen copyright 
protection today as new technologies emerge and as content is increasingly distributed 
through the Internet, whether based on natural justice or on the economic incentive 
theory, have asserted greater property rights against the public domain.272
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Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 286-287 (1996)   
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In recent years, there has been increasing attention paid to the public domain as 
the pool of common resources that is freely available to the general public for use. The 
focus on the public domain stems primarily from proponents of lesser protection under 
the copyright regime on the basis that content can only be developed when there is a large 
amount of free resources to draw from.273 It has been argued that a larger public domain 
is necessary for authorship to thrive and that the grant of extensive property rights in 
creative works prevents new authors from creating works built upon existing materials.274
Indeed, a rich and diverse public domain is vital to the growth of the creative content 
industries for authors require a large amount of resources to develop and create new 
works. After all, “the public domain is the law’s primary safeguard of the raw material 
that makes authorship possible.”275 Nonetheless, there are opposing view points contrary 
to this low protectionist point of view on a general theory of the public domain.276 It has 
been argued that there really is no general theory of the public domain and that “the 
public domain is simply what remains after all methods of protection are taken into 
account.”277 While authorship thrives on a rich and diverse public domain and a creative 
work is “necessarily a recombination or transformation of what has gone before,”278 the 
grant of property rights to authors for their creative works does not necessarily have an 
adverse impact on “the enterprise of authorship”279 because the recognition of a property 
273
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right in creative works is only “in those elements of the work, small as they may be, that 
the author has contributed.”280 In fact, it is argued that authorship thrives where authors 
are ensured of a market in which their works may be commercialized and that there is 
indeed a necessity for the law to provide copyright protection in authors’ works so that 
authors may be able to establish these necessary markets for the commercialization of 
their works. The argument for more extensive rights have been premised on the 
protection of authors in the digital age by extending rights “into every corner where 
consumers derive value from literary and artistic works”281 as this would be the most 
appropriate way to connect authors with their audiences “free from interference by 
political sovereigns or the will of patrons.”282
As new technologies develop in the market place, the extension of rights under 
the copyright regime ought to be done with a great degree of caution. The growth of the 
content industries, as well as the general growth of society, technology and culture 
depends on the building and use of existing creative materials that are easily accessible. 
The extension of rights to protect authors may indeed be feasible, considering the 
increasing number of authors, who make their works available through the Internet and 
digital technologies. The empowerment independent sound recording artists have as a 
result of the new distribution channels that the Internet has opened up for the distribution 
of their sound recordings may also require an extension of authors’ rights. Indeed, 
authors must have their rights in their works protected to ensure that rewards due to the 
author for the production of creative works are fairly given.283 However, there is a 
general necessity for creative works of authorship to be made available for the general 
public’s use as the imposition of strong property rights against certain uses of the work 
has the general effect of stifling societal, cultural and technological growth. More 
importantly though, is that the extension of property rights in the creative content 
industries has the effect of preventing new content markets from emerging as property 
rights are enforced to maintain existing business models and industrial structures. 
Industrial growth in the long-run will be restricted by the over-extension of copyright 
protection in creative works and that an inclination towards lesser property rights within 
the copyright regime will allow the content industries to develop as they experience 
changes in their technological environment.           
The common pool of available resources that is not within the control of the 
copyright owner is also necessary for the general development of culture and society. 
Today, the Internet and digital technologies offer consumers of creative works a choice as 
to the manner in which creative works are consumed and a general culture of mixing-and-
matching bits of works and information appears to be a growing consumer culture over 
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the Internet. Indeed, the “most striking power provided by emerging technologies”284 is 
“the growing power of consumers to filter what they see.”285 Above that however, 
consumers of creative works are likely to be exposed “to a life where one can 
individually and collectively participate in making something new,”286 which will build a 
culture that creates new works and shares those works with others.287 It is submitted that 
the growth of culture and society as a whole stems from the generation of new works of 
creative art by consumers of creative works coupled with the sharing and dissemination 
of ideas and art with other consumers. The passive reception of creative works by 
consumers has built a market for copyrighted works as authors, with the incentives 
provided under copyright law, produce “consumable works”288 for consumers to 
consume.289 However, the public interest functionality of copyright law to ensure that 
there are sufficient materials for the public to use “for the progress of science and the 
useful arts” will only be fulfilled when creative works are available to the consumer for 
transformative uses as the growth of culture and society as a whole stems from a vibrant 
and healthy interchange of creative materials within a public arena.290 The production of 
new creative works really depends on the availability of raw materials that may be 
rendered inaccessible by excessive protection of copyright owner’s properties. It has been 
said that “when copyright has gone wrong in recent times, it has been by taking itself too 
seriously, by foolish assumptions about the amount of originality open to man as an 
artificer, by sanctimonious pretensions about the iniquities of imitation.”291 If the public 
domain operates to provide artists with the resources to inspire new works of creation,292
284 CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 8 (Princeton University Press 2001)  
285 See id. at 8 
286 LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 9 (Random House 2001) 
287
 It is said that “technology could enable a whole generation to create – remixed films, new forms of 
music, digital art, a new kind of story telling, writing, a new technology for poetry, criticism, political 
activism – and then, through the infrastructure of the Internet, share that creativity with others. This is the 
art through which free culture is built.” See id. at 9  
288
 Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C.L. REV. 397, 402 (2003) 
289
 Copyright law responds to the passive consumer “primarily by ensuring that conditions exist for a 
functioning market in copyrighted works, i.e. by making sure there are works for them to consume. It does 
this by solving the basic goods problem i.e., by giving entitlements to authors, so that authors will have 
adequate incentives to produce consumable works, and then permit the market to direct investment so as to 
satisfy consumer preferences. Rights against unauthorized reproduction, public distribution, and public 
performance thus permit producers to exploit these copyright markets without fear that initial investments 
will be undercut. Once the law sets entitlements, competition among goods will serve consumer interests, 
because they are, under this view, rather minimal.” See id. at 402-403   
290
 The understanding of culture in modern anthropology is a “shared, collectively generated constellation 
of meaning; its most salient dimensions were realized socially, generally in publicly performed and 
politically effectual signifying practices.” The recognition of property rights in creative works however, 
removes cultural forms and makes it private commodities. It is said that “in consumer societies, … many of 
the most accessible, widely known, and compelling of cultural forms around which meanings are forged are 
not shared in a singular collectivity but are the private properties of corporations with economic interests in 
preserving their exclusivity. This tense intersection between culture’s public space and the commodity’s 
private place … challenges conventional Anglo-American legal categories still oriented around social 
divisions and distinctions characteristic of modern understandings of civil society.” ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, 
THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES 250 (Duke University Press 1988)       
291 BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 78 (Columbia University Press 1967)  
292
 It has been argued that the public domain provides artists with the sensory stimuli necessary to generate 
creative works. Professor A. Samuel Oddi relies on Emmanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason to explain 
47
the extension of overly broad property rights under the copyright regime will have an 
adverse impact on the very act of artistic creation as it would deny “full access to the 
stimulus value of the protected creation.”293
The fair use doctrine, it is said, is a “safety valve”294 within copyright law to 
ensure that property rights in creative works are not enforced over-extensively to deny 
users of creative works the ability to use the works for “criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship or 
research.”295 The fair use doctrine operates as a mechanism within copyright law to strike 
the delicate balance between an author’s property interest in the copyrighted work and 
the public’s interest in being able to access the work. The use of creative content for the 
further development of art and literary works is to a very large extent facilitated by the 
doctrine, which allows users of content to use the work for the purposes of educational, 
societal or cultural growth without seeking prior authorization from the copyright owner. 
The fair use doctrine had been said to be a response of the courts to circumstances where 
transaction costs for obtaining permission to use the work is too high as a result of market 
failure, where “the possibility of consensual bargain has broken down in some way.”296
The advent of the Internet and digital technologies however, may reduce the transaction 
costs for obtaining permission to use the work to virtually zero and if this becomes a 
reality, then the fair use doctrine, justified as a solution to market failures, will be 
rendered obsolete.297 As it is predicted that “fair use will recede as a mechanism for 
resolving market failures arising from transaction costs”298 and as copyright owners are 
able to impose fees upon users for every use of their works, it is submitted that these 
property rights that are given to copyright owners of creative works ought not to be too 
extensive as the need for creative materials in the pubic domain increases in order that 
the two forms of cognition, which is used as a foundation to elaborate the process of producing a creative 
work. The first cognitive process is based on external perception of sensations, which Kant calls “empirical 
or a posteriori cognition.” The other form of cognition is internal and within an individual’s mental process, 
which Kant calls “pure or a priori cognition.” The cognitive process involves a sensation of an external 
stimulus, the perception of the sensation and its ordering to space and time. This perception may be then 
further processed cognitively to generate an idea. In order for the creative process to continue, there must 
be a “transformation from the intangible idea conception to a tangible implementation” or a “creation.” 
This external perception of an ordinary event may to “creative individuals be a stimulus toward a 
fundamental scientific discovery, a magnificent work of art or an invention of great societal value.” A. 
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new creative works may be produced. If new authors and artists are required to pay for 
their every single use of creative content as a result of over extensive property rights, then 
the very act of producing creative works for the general public will be adversely affected 
in the long term. The next portion of this chapter addresses the fair use doctrine and the 
effect of its lessening role on the general endeavor of creativity and authorship.
Two principles of copyright law are important in achieving a balance between 
uses of creative works by the public and protection of the property rights of the copyright 
owner. The notion that creative works must be original to qualify for copyright 
protection299 and the protection of original expressions and not mere ideas allow the 
courts to draw boundaries as to which works ought to be protected as a matter of law and 
which works ought to be within the public domain for general public use. Both the 
notions of originality and the idea-expression dichotomy determine the boundaries 
between the private and exclusive property rights of authors and artists in their works and 
the general public interest of society to obtain access to creative works and whether 
particular uses of the work by members of society infringe the rights of the copyright 
owner. The law’s rationale for the notion of originality and the idea-expression 
dichotomy is that the recognition of exclusive property rights over the work that would 
prevent others from having access and making use of it would only be justified if the 
author or artist has produced a work of original expression that contributes generally to 
society.300 New authors are thereby encouraged by the idea-expression dichotomy to 
“convey the ideas and facts expressed in the copyright holder’s work – and for that matter 
also to express their own ideas – so long as they do so in words, graphics, or other 
expressive components that are not “substantially similar” to those that comprise the 
copyright holder’s work.”301
In Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,302 the Circuit Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit addressed the standard for originality when it had to decide if a 
subsequent motion picture infringed copyright in an earlier play when “the similarities 
between the two are too specific and detailed to have resulted from chance.”303 Judge 
Hand in delivering the opinion of the Court recognized that the broader plot or outline of 
a play can never be copyrighted. Nonetheless, Judge Hand felt that in the case before 
him, there were significantly dramatic scenes between both the play and the motion 
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picture that were almost identical and whilst much of the picture may not be attributable 
to the play as some parts were drawn from a novel, that did not preclude the Court’s 
finding of a copyright infringement of the original play. According to Judge Hand, it was 
sufficient to show that substantial parts of the play were taken and included in the 
subsequent motion picture in order for the Court to decide that the subsequent work was 
an infringement of copyright, for, according to Judge Hand, “no plagiarist can excuse the 
wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate.”304
Justice Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.305 had, through his 
judgment, made it clear that a work need not necessarily have to be a work of fine art in 
order to qualify for copyright protection. Chromolithographs that are used to advertise a 
circus would qualify for copyright protection despite the fact its “pictorial quality attracts 
the crowd and therefore gives them a real use – if use means to increase trade and to help 
make money.”306 To Justice Holmes, “a picture is none the less a picture and none the 
less a subject of copyright that it is used for an advertisement. And if pictures may be 
used to advertise soap, or the theatre, or monthly magazines, as they are, they may be 
used to advertise a circus.”307 More importantly however, Justice Holmes felt that the 
Court had a very limited role to play in deciding questions of originality because “it 
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute 
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and 
most obvious limits.”308 In its essence, Justice Holmes’ judgment affords copyright 
protection “for any work exhibiting a human reaction, however simple and whatever the 
source of the creator’s inspiration.”309
One of the more difficult aspects of determining the question of originality is 
where works from the public domain are used to produce a new work and the courts must 
then assess the “quantity and quality of original effort that has gone into producing a 
variation of a public domain work.”310 In Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 
Inc.,311 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had the task of deciding if mezzotint 
engraving of paintings that were taken from old masters in the public domain were 
eligible for copyright protection. The argument that the engravings could not qualify for 
copyright protection because they were reproductions of works in the public domain was 
rejected by the Court, which reasoned that while copyright was not available for works 
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already in the public domain, translations or other versions of works in the public domain 
would be eligible for copyright protection and the mezzotints in this case were such 
versions of works in the pubic domain.312 The Court had felt that any variation to works 
already in the public domain may be inadvertent but this would not affect the recognition 
of copyright in the subsequent work. To the Court, “a copyist’s bad eyesight or defective 
musculature, or a shock caused by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently 
distinguishable variations. Having hit upon such a variation unintentionally, the author 
may adopt it as his and copyright it.”313 This approach provides a clear guideline as to 
when a work that builds upon works in the public domain may satisfy the originality 
requirement and qualify for copyright protection. Where a subsequent work builds upon a 
work in a public domain and is a variation of the work, the court will be inclined to 
recognize copyright in the subsequent work. The approach rewards an author for the 
production of the subsequent work while retaining the original work in the public domain 
for the general use of the public.314
The protection of creative expression under copyright law works in tandem with 
the requirement for originality to ensure that only the essence of products of authorship 
are recognized as being eligible for copyright protection. In this way, the Courts ensure 
that the general public is not denied access to the underlying theme and ideas of the work. 
The Copyright Act 1976 expressly provides that ideas are ineligible for copyright 
protection315 and the Courts have consistently affirmed the freedom of the public to use 
ideas of underlying works to produce new and creative works.316 In Baker v. Selden,317 a 
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system of ruled lines and headings were used to illustrate a method of book-keeping and 
the Supreme Court had grappled with the question of whether copyright existed in the 
system of book-keeping via the recognition of copyright in the book itself. While it was 
clear to the Court that the book “conveying information on the subject of book-keeping 
and containing detailed explanations of the art”318 would be eligible for copyright 
protection, it was more evident to the Court that there was “a clear distinction between 
the book, as such, and the art which it is intended to illustrate.”319 Novelty in the art 
expressed in the book was a matter for patent protection and not copyright, the Court had 
felt, and to the Court, “to give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art 
described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, 
would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public.”320 Unless a patent was obtained for the 
art contained within the book, the public would be able to have access to the ideas 
contained in the book. The Court held that copyright existed in the book and the ideas 
expressed therein and while the public is enjoined from printing and publishing the book 
or any material in it, the system of book-keeping expressed therein was an art that the 
public may use and practice.321
The decision of Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service Co., Inc,322 reflected a more definitive approach to the question of originality and 
had denied copyright protection to compilations of facts unless the compilation, by their 
selection and arrangement, displayed the requisite originality necessary to protect the 
compilation under copyright laws. In this case, the Court had to decide if copyright 
protection could exist for the publication of a typical telephone directory that consisted of 
white pages and yellow pages. The Court held that while there is copyright in the 
directory as a whole because it contains some forward text and some original material in 
the yellow pages, the white pages were not protected under copyright because it did not 
meet the prerequisite of originality required for protection. Rejecting the “sweat of the
brow” theory that copyright was a reward for the hard work that accompanied the 
compilation of facts, the Court held that the grant of copyright in factual compilations is 
possible in situations where the facts are selected, coordinated and arranged in such a 
manner that they satisfied the originality requirement. To the Court, “originality requires 
only that the author make the selection or arrangement independently (i.e. without 
copying that arrangement or selection from another work), and that it display some 
minimal level of creativity.”323 The selection of names, towns and telephone numbers to 
fill up the white pages in this case was to the Court, “devoid of even the slightest trace of 
creativity” and was therefore unable to qualify for copyright protection. Whilst there was 
sufficient effort exerted to render the white pages directory useful, the Court felt that 
there was insufficient creativity expressed to make the directory original. The Court went 
on to make it clear that “copyright rewards originality, not effort.”324
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It is submitted that the notion of originality and the idea-expression dichotomy 
will arise more frequently before the Courts in disputes pertaining to copyright law as 
users are now exposed to the many different ways of using copyrighted content as well as 
works from the public domain to generate new and creative works of their own. As new 
authors as well as private home users of copyrighted content, made available over the 
Internet by authors themselves, become increasingly aware of the ability of the Internet 
and digital technologies to make modifications and alterations to existing works as well 
as compile and gather pieces of separate works to form a composite whole, the law will 
be required to address the extent to which an author’s property rights end and the public’s 
interests begin when new authors and users begin exploring these new ways of creative 
expression. If author’s rights are extended to every segment of the market where 
consumers derive value and the fair use doctrine is rendered obsolete as the Internet 
lowers transaction costs to a bare minimum, then there is a reason to delineate the 
boundaries of private property clearly as users of creative works become increasingly 
able to produce and create works of their own from existing works. Websites, for 
example, may comprise compilations of different pieces of works that are digitally put 
together325 and “image, text, movie, and sound files are much easier to alter, transform, 
and incorporate into other works.”326 As an increasing amount of creative works are 
generated by new authors and ordinary users through the technologies and capabilities of 
the Internet, copyright law’s principle that a work must be an original expression of 
authorship to qualify for protection will become a bedrock guide to deciding the limits of 
copyright protection in existing works and in recognizing property rights in new works.           
As digital technologies introduce fundamental changes to content industries and 
as copyright law struggles to keep up with the changing technological environment to 
extend rights where necessary and to ensure that the public has sufficient access to 
materials upon which new materials may be produced, it has been suggested that 
copyright law be recast as a right to commercial exploitation.327 A commercial 
exploitation right328 may present a solution to the challenges faced by copyright law in 
accommodating technological change through its various doctrines and principles in the 
digital age and would allow authors to extend rights into every corner where commercial 
value from creative works may be derived. It is suggested that the commercial 
exploitation right may be introduced to replace the copyright regime, where the 
reproduction right is central to any question of infringement.329 It is however argued that 
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today, the “making of digital reproductions is an unavoidable incident of reading, 
viewing, listening to, learning from, sharing, improving, and reusing works embodied in 
digital media.”330 As the making of copies is unavoidable for uses of digital works, 
“reproduction is no longer an appropriate way to measure infringement”331 because of the 
“the centrality of copying to use of digital technology.”332  If the reproduction right, 
which is “the fundamental copyright right”333 is no longer an appropriate benchmark to 
determine questions of infringement, it is suggested that a commercial exploitation right 
be introduced in its place because the public already understands that “making money 
using other people’s works is copyright infringement, while non commercial uses are all 
okay.”334
Replacing the reproduction right with the commercial exploitation right may 
therefore mold the law more closely to popular expectations and would ease enforcement 
efforts and make the mass education of the public more appealing.335 It has also been 
suggested that the “affirmative right should include a limited privilege to circumvent any 
technological access controls”336 to “gain access to, extract, use, and reuse the ideas, 
facts, information, and other public domain material embodied in protected works.”337
The commercial exploitation right should also provide “a privilege to reproduce, adapt, 
transmit, perform, or display so much of the protected expression as is required in order 
to gain access to the unprotected elements”338 so as to make “the public’s right to the 
public domain explicit.”339 The notion that copyright law is intended to protect creative 
authorship to provide authors with the necessary incentives to create works for the 
general public is a very noble one. However, it cannot be denied that copyright law is 
really about the commercialization of creative content in a vibrant market place. At the 
end of the day, the more fundamental purpose of the law is to balance the tension 
between private property rights and public interest to ensure that the ultimate aim of the 
constitutional clause is met and that society as a whole benefits from the creative efforts 
of authors. A commercial exploitation right may serve this purpose. 
Setting limitations upon the private property rights of copyright owners may also 
provide the public with greater access to creative works. These limitations upon private 
property rights may take several forms. Law makers may set limitations upon the 
duration for copyright protection by introducing a limited term of protection for the 
exclusive rights provided under the law. At present, the copyright protection term is for a 
period that extends from the creation of the work for the life time of the author plus 
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seventy years340 after the author’s death.341 Limiting the term of copyright protection to 
provide the public with access to the work within a shorter period requires Congress to 
consider various important policy questions. The limitations upon the duration for 
copyright protection imposed by the Statute of Anne 1710, for example, were premised 
on Parliament’s policy to break up the monopoly that the English booksellers had over 
the book trade. Imposing a limitation upon present copyright protection may be premised 
on a public welfare policy to provide greater public access to creative works for 
transformative and developmental uses.342 It is however, important to note that the Berne 
Convention for the protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act 1971) sets a 
minimum standard for copyright protection.343 Under Article 7(1), the minimum term of 
protection is the life of the author and fifty years after his or her death.                 
Limitations may also be imposed on the property rights of copyright owners 
through the requirement that the copyright owner satisfies certain formalities to entitle 
him or her to copyright protection in creative works. The decision of the Supreme Court 
in Wheaton v. Peters344 made it clear that copyright was a statutory creation in the United 
States and an author seeking copyright protection will have to comply with the 
formalities imposed by the Copyright Act.345 Upon adherence to the Berne Convention 
however, formalities compliance in the United States has ceased to be a prerequisite for 
copyright protection.346 Although formalities are no longer a prerequisite to copyright 
protection, the imposition of certain formal requirements may provide a limitation to the 
property rights of copyright owners so that the public may have increased access to 
creative works. A short term for copyright protection with an option for renewal may 
provide the balance that the law seeks to achieve between private and public interests. 
The Statute of Anne 1710, for example, provided authors with two successive copyright 
protection terms of 14 years each, with the requirement that the author renews the 
copyright in the work after the first 14 years lapses. The implementation of such a 
provision today however, will be prohibited by Article 7 (1) of the Berne Convention, 
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which mandates that the minimum term for copyright protection is for the life of the 
author plus fifty years after his or her death.   
The law may also provide for greater public access to works by introducing a 
compulsory licensing scheme into the present copyright regime. Subjecting creative 
content to compulsory licensing would allow the public to use the work with the payment 
of a fixed statutory royalty. Non dramatic musical works are presently subject to 
compulsory licensing under § 115 of the Copyright Act 1976 and any person, who wishes 
to obtain a compulsory license to make and distribute phonorecords is required to serve a 
notice of that intention to the copyright owner.347 A compulsory licensing scheme such as 
that under § 115 will provide the public with access to creative works348 and allow 
copyright owners to receive fair compensation for public uses of their works.349 The 
determination of reasonable royalty rates for the public’s uses of creative works may be 
set by copyright arbitration royalty panels that are appointed and convened by the 
Librarian of Congress under § 801. A compulsory licensing regime will to a large extent 
remove many of the present restrictions that copyright owners impose upon uses of their 
works and ensure that the public is able to use these works for transformative, 
developmental and creative purposes. Compulsory licenses have been said to be 
“antithesis of the [copyright owner’s] exclusive rights”350 and it is important to note that 
the Berne Convention restricts the application of compulsory licenses in several ways.351
The final limitation upon the right of the copyright owner to ensure that the public 
may make use of creative works recognizes that certain derivative uses of content may be 
allowed under the fair use doctrine. The production of parodies, for example, will be 
allowed as a fair use of a work, especially where the parody is transformative of the 
original work and confers a benefit upon society. The Supreme Court in Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,352 for example, was of the opinion that parodies, like “less 
ostensibly humorous forms of criticism,” may provide social benefit by “shedding light 
on an earlier work, and, in that process, creating a new one.”353 To the Court, “there is no 
protectible derivative market for criticism”354 in which copyright owners may assert 
property rights. By recognizing that certain derivative works are criticisms or parodies of 
347
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original works and that copyright owners are not likely to “license at any price, derivative 
works that criticize their original creation,”355 law makers may set limits upon the rights 
provided under § 106 of the Copyright Act 1976.
These limitations upon private property rights ensure that the public is able to 
gain access to creative works for uses that facilitate the growth and development of 
society, education and culture. By restricting private property rights, the law may allow 
the growth of a richer and more diverse public domain from which the public may draw 
upon to develop, create and produce new forms of art, knowledge and creative works. It 
has been said that “creativity is impossible without a rich public domain” and that 
“[n]othing today, likely nothing since we tamed fire, is genuinely new: [c]ulture, like 
science and technology grows by accretion, each new creator building on the works of 
those who came before.”356 Copyright was historically statutorily codified to ensure that 
creative works were not made inaccessible through the control that the English 
booksellers had over the book trade and that the public had access to these works so that 
learning could take place within society. Education, cultural development and societal 
growth today require the same accessibility to creative works. Providing the public with 
access to creative works will allow general growth and development to occur within 
society. The delicate balance between private rights of creative content providers and 
public interest in access to creative content can only be attained through copyright law. 
Part 4: The Fair Use Doctrine
The fair use doctrine was originally developed by the judiciary in the late-
eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries as the English law and equity courts construed 
the Statute of Anne 1710.357 The courts in the United States adopted the fair use defense 
in 1839358 and it remained a doctrine of the judiciary until it was statutorily codified in 
1978 in the Copyright Act.359 It has been said that “the doctrine of fair use, originally 
created and articulated in case law, permits courts to avoid rigid application of the 
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is 
designed to foster.”360 The judiciary has not found the application of the doctrine to be an 
easy one and has referred to it as the “most troublesome in the whole law of 
copyright,”361 noting that the “doctrine is entirely equitable and is so flexible as virtually 
to defy definition.”362 Section 107 of the Copyright Act offers some guidelines to assist 
the courts in determining the issues of fair use and the courts have regarded the four 
statutory factors under section 107 as being equally important in the court’s analysis of 
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fair use, “notwithstanding the oft-quoted assertion of the paramount importance of the 
fourth factor.”363 Each case before the courts on the fair use doctrine is decided on a case-
by-case basis and this “task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules.”364
The first consideration under section 107 requires an analysis of “the purpose and 
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes.”365 As subsequent authors build upon works of previous 
authors, the nature of the use of the work by a subsequent author becomes important in 
deciding whether the use of the work is a fair use. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc.,366 the Supreme Court stated that when a new work “adds something new, with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning or 
message,” the court ought to ask “whether and to what extent the new work is 
“transformative.””367 The Supreme Court felt that “although such transformative use is 
not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright to promote science 
and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works 
thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the 
confines of copyright and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the 
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair 
use.”368 The point that a subsequent use of a creative work will be more likely to be 
regarded as a fair use if the work is transformative of the first is further made in Castle 
Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc.,369 where the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit stated that “if the secondary use adds value to the original – if 
copyrightable expression in the original work is used as raw material, transformed in the 
creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings – this is the 
very type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of 
society. In short, the goal of copyright to promote science and the arts is generally 
furthered by the creation of transformative works.”370 The finding that the use of a 
subsequent work is fair use is also dependent on whether the use of the subsequent work 
is for commercial purposes. Using a subsequent work for commercial purposes creates a 
presumption against the finding of a fair use,371 although the presumption may be 
rebutted, such as when commercial uses of the work is minimal or when the public 
benefits from the subsequent work. In Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,372 for 
example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that the courts were “free to 
consider the public benefit resulting from a particular use notwithstanding the fact that 
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the alleged infringer may gain commercially”373 and decided that the disassembly of a 
copyrighted computer program to gain access to the ideas and functional elements 
embodied in it was “a fair use of the copyrighted work as a matter of law.”374 The 
defendant’s reliance on the fair use doctrine must also be equitable and where the 
defendant’s use of the work is for profit-making and where the defendant’s use of the 
work usurps a significant portion of the copyright holder’s market, the application of the 
fair use doctrine will be precluded, even though the subsequent work contains materials 
of possible public importance.375
The second consideration for the courts in a fair use analysis under section 107 is 
the “nature of the copyrighted work.”376 Under this consideration, the courts would 
consider a highly creative work to have more protection from unauthorized copying and
would subject more informational and functional works to the doctrine of fair use. The 
Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,377 mentioned that “this factor calls 
for the recognition that some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection 
than others, with the consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the 
former works are copied”378 and provided examples in cases where different types of 
works were contrasted to illustrate the point. In Stewart v. Abend,379 the Supreme Court 
regarded that “in general, fair use is more likely to be found in factual works than in 
fictional works.”380 The Supreme Court in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises381 thought that the fair use doctrine had a narrower application for 
unpublished materials as it explained that “while even substantial quotations might 
qualify as fair use in a review of a published work or a news account of a speech that had 
been delivered to the public or disseminated to the press, the author’s right to control the 
first public appearance of his expression weighs against such use of the work before its 
release.”382 The Supreme Court had also thought that the copying of a news broadcast 
373
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may have a stronger claim for fair use than the copying of a motion picture, as was stated 
in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios.383
The third consideration for the courts in an analysis of the fair use doctrine is “the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole.”384 This inquiry extends beyond the examination of the subsequent work as being 
quantitatively substantial to the original work to whether the use of the subsequent work 
of the first is qualitatively substantial. In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises,385 the Supreme Court thought that the subsequent work had only quoted an 
insubstantial portion of the original work. Nonetheless, the insubstantial portion that was 
taken was “essentially the heart”386 of the original work as well as the “most interesting 
and moving parts of the entire manuscript”387 and would thereby weigh against the 
finding of fair use. The Court also felt that “a taking may not be excused merely because 
it is insubstantial with respect to the infringing work”388 and “conversely, the fact that a 
substantial portion of the infringing work was copied verbatim is evidence of the 
qualitative value of the copied material, both to the originator and to the plagiarist who 
seeks to profit from marketing someone else’s copyrighted expression.”389
The fourth consideration for the courts in the fair use analysis is “the effect of the 
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”390 In MCA, Inc. v. 
Wilson,391 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained the fourth fair use factor 
by stating that “where a claim of fair use is made, a balance must sometimes be struck 
between the benefit the public will derive if the use is permitted and the personal gain the 
copyright owner will receive if the use is denied. The less adverse effect that an alleged 
infringing use has on the copyright owner’s expectation of gain, the less public benefit 
needs to be shown to justify the use.”392 The Supreme Court in Sony Corporation of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.393 addressed this factor by stating that a 
subsequent use of a copyright owner’s work should not deprive the copyright owner of 
the incentives that Congress intended the copyright owner to have by the provision of 
rights that may be exploited in a commercial market. According to the Supreme Court, 
“the purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort. Even copying for non 
commercial purposes may impair the copyright holder’s ability to obtain the rewards that 
Congress intended him to have. But a use that has no demonstrable effect upon the 
potential market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order 
to protect the incentive to create. The prohibition of such noncommercial uses would 
383
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merely inhibit access to ideas without any countervailing benefit.”394 In considering the 
potential market in which a copyright owner is entitled to exploit the work, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Salinger v. Random House, Inc.395 thought that the 
potential market was the mere opportunity opened to the copyright owner to sell the 
copyrighted work396 and in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,397 the 
Supreme Court stated that this analysis should take into account not only the harm to the 
market for the original work but also harm to the market for any derivative works.398
The fair use doctrine is said to have been employed to “permit uncompensated 
transfers that are socially desirable but not capable of effectuation through the market.”399
This view is based on the market system that is regarded as a system where consensual 
exchanges of goods take place. Where markets do not function effectively to allocate 
resources between individuals in the market, such as when “the markets fail to generate 
economically desirable outcomes”400 or “when using the market process would threaten 
other social goals,”401 other modes of resource control will be employed by the legal, 
economic or social system to reallocate resources. The fair use doctrine is said to be the 
“judicial response to market failure in the copyright context”402 and serves to allocate 
resources in copyrighted content between the copyright owner and users who desire 
accessibility to the work, where the circumstances of the market place make it impossible 
for users to obtain authorization from copyright owners for the use the work. Three 
conditions must be satisfied in order that perfect competition may exist within a market 
place to ensure that individual market transactions result in a maximization of value.403
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The first is that all costs and benefits to the transactions that generate them must be 
internal,404 the second is that there must be perfect knowledge405 and the third is that there 
must be an absence of transaction costs.406 These three conditions must be present in 
order that it may be appropriate to rely on consensual bargains to achieve socially 
desirable results. The law of copyright facilitates the functioning of the consensual 
market by creating property rights, lowering transaction costs, providing valuable 
information and containing mechanisms for the enforcement of rights.407 In most cases, 
users of copyrighted content would proceed through the market and obtain the copyright 
owner’s authorization for the use of the work although at times, copyright markets will 
not always function adequately, such as when “bargaining may be exceedingly 
expensive, or it may be impractical to obtain enforcement against non purchasers, or 
other market flaws might preclude achievement of desirable consensual exchanges”408
and in these cases, the market has failed and is not able to mediate between the public 
interest to have access to the work and the copyright owner’s interest to receive 
compensation for the use of the work. Where the market has failed, the courts apply the 
fair use doctrine “when they approve a user’s departure from the market.”409
New technologies are said to pose a market barrier that prevents users of 
copyrighted content from obtaining authorization for the use of the content from the 
copyright owner. This is because high transaction costs are involved with seeking 
authorization to use the work as a new technology would not have established the 
necessary market channels upon which users may rely to obtain authorization from 
copyright owners, which would make the “purchase of permission”410 from copyright 
owners “cumbersome and expensive.”411 The correspondingly low anticipated profits 
from use of the work would also discourage users from seeking authorization from the 
copyright owner because of the high transaction costs involved. 
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The introduction of a new technology into the market impacts existing business 
structures within the copyright industries to a very large extent because users have new 
ways to gain access to copyrighted content. Music file sharing technology and online 
distribution of music content, for example, have brought profound changes to the sound 
recording industry. The very existing business model and industrial structure of the sound 
recording industry are threatened as artists have direct contact with their listeners and the 
industry faces loss of jobs as their role as the intermediary between recording artists and 
music listeners lessen with online music distribution.412 With as many as 2.6 billion 
music files being downloaded and shared without authorization each month and as many 
as approximately 600,000 movies being downloaded from the Internet without 
authorization daily through out the world,413 the Internet has certainly offered users of 
copyrighted content unprecedented access to files containing sound recordings and 
motion pictures that were unavailable to users before. The fair use doctrine was raised as 
an affirmative defense for the unauthorized uses of music files over peer-to-peer 
networks on the file-sharing technology in the Napster case in three specific instances, 
which were sampling, where users make temporary copies of a work before deciding to 
purchase it, space-shifting, where users are allowed to access a sound recording through 
the Napster system that they already own in audio CD format and the permissive 
distribution of sound recordings by new and established artists.414 The Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court for N.D. of California’s decision that the 
use of sound recordings files over the Napster technology was not a fair use for several 
reasons under Section 107.415 According to the Court of Appeals, the use of the sound 
recording files over the network was non transformative and was of a commercial 
nature;416 the “musical compositions and sound recordings are creative in nature … 
which cuts against a finding of fair use under the second factor;”417 that “Napster users 
engage in “wholesale copying” of copyrighted work because file transfer necessarily 
“involves copying the entirety of the copyrighted work;””418 and that the District Court’s 
finding that the downloading of music files from the Internet harms the market of the 
copyright owner by reducing CD sales amongst college students and raises barriers to the 
copyright owner’s entry into the market for the digital downloading of music was a 
“correct application of the fair use doctrine.”419
Arguably, the Court could have also proceeded to analyze the fair use doctrine in 
the Napster case using the market failure theory. The first part of the test to determine if 
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the fair use doctrine will apply in any given case of copyright infringement is whether 
there is a market failure, where the possibility of consensual bargain between the 
copyright owner and the user becomes impossible.420 In the Napster case, it would appear 
that the market for digital download of music was fully functional because the copyright 
owner had already entered the digital music download market or had planned to enter the 
market within a relatively short period.421 The presence of the copyright owner within the 
market would allow consensual bargains to take place between the copyright owner and 
the user for the download of music, which would prevent the application of the fair use 
doctrine in the Napster case. Even if there was a market failure, the availability of music 
files over the Internet for downloading for $0.99 a song over the present Napster 
downloading service422 would indicate that the price that the copyright owner is asking 
for the digital download of a music file is small and hence lower than what the user 
would offer. This being the case, social value is increased wherever there is a voluntary 
transaction between the copyright owner and the user.423 The third element of the market 
failure test concerns the economic welfare of the copyright owner and where the 
copyright owner would suffer no harm or disincentive by allowing users free use of the 
work, the fair use doctrine ought to apply to allow users to use the copyrighted work.424
In the Napster case, the copyright owner would inevitably suffer harm or disincentive 
from entering the digital download market if the uses of music files over the Napster 
network were regarded to be a fair use. Indeed, the District Court in Napster conceded 
that the “defendant has contributed to a new attitude that digitally-downloaded songs 
ought to be free – an attitude that creates formidable hurdles for the establishment of a 
commercial downloading market.”425 Using the market failure analysis, therefore the 
Court would have arrived at the same conclusion that the use of the music files over the 
Napster network was not a fair use.
Indeed, with the far-reaching effects of the Internet and the connectivity authors 
and artists have with users of their works because of digital technologies that facilitate the 
distribution and dissemination of copyrighted works, the question of how relevant the fair 
use doctrine is today becomes an important one. If the doctrine is a response to market 
failure where it is impossible for the copyright owner and the user to reach a consensual 
bargain for the transfer of the copyrighted work, the Internet and digital technologies will 
render the doctrine virtually inapplicable in today’s copyright markets because digital 
rights management that sets systems of fee collection and revenue distribution will allow 
consensual bargains to take place between copyright owners and users for the use of the 
work.426 Where consensual bargains between copyright owner and users become possible 
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through on-line facilities over the Internet, users of copyrighted works will have to seek 
authorization from copyright owners for the use of the work and “consumers can be 
expected to pay for what previously they copied free.”427 This being the case, in the 
Internet age, copyright law would have extended into “every corner where consumers 
derive value from literary and artistic works”428 and copyright owners can be ensured of 
the protection of their incentives under copyright law as works become increasingly 
available through the Internet and as users will no longer be able to justify an 
unauthorized use of a copyrighted work based on the impossibility of reaching a 
consensual bargain with the copyright owner.      
As copyright protection of works of authorship grows, there will be inevitable 
concerns about the extent to which copyright protection ought to reach into the public’s 
interests in accessing the work, especially by second authors seeking to borrow from the 
original work to produce new materials. The use of copyrighted content for 
transformative purposes lies at the heart of present debates between proponents for 
stronger copyright protection and their opponents, who argue that the expansion of rights 
has the effect of stifling transformative uses of copyrighted works “that parallels, but is 
far more systematic than the problem of private censorship.”429 It has been said that “to 
the extent that copyright in an author’s potential source material requires payment for the 
quotation, reformulation, adaptation, or parody of that material, some such transformative
uses will never transpire”430 and it is indeed difficult to disagree with the probability that 
general cultural, societal and technological growth as a whole will be adversely affected 
by the enforcement of rights that are too extensive.431 The moderation of copyright 
protection is a sensible stance to take in light of the extensive enforcement efforts that the 
sound recording industry has undertaken against users who download music files from 
the Internet. Although it is given that copyright owners have entitlements and property 
rights in their works to provide them with the necessary incentives to produce new works, 
it is indeed true that the production of creative works that copyright law seeks to foster by 
the provision of incentives ought not to be an end in itself because “publication without 
easy access to the product would defeat the social purpose of copyright already 
mentioned as primary.”432
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With authors becoming increasingly empowered to distribute and disseminate 
their works independently over the Internet and with digital technologies, the call for 
greater copyright protection of creative works will very likely shift from intermediaries, 
such as sound recording companies and motion pictures studios to authors or creative 
artists. The assertion and enforcement of greater property rights will most likely come 
from authors and artists and it will be difficult for law and policy makers to ignore the 
call for more extensive rights as an incentive to create from the creators of creative works 
themselves. As the role of the publisher or intermediary in bringing a copyrighted work 
to the public changes and authors and artists take a more central role in marketing, 
distributing and disseminating their works, a proliferation of “unedited 
communications”433 such as “poetic musings, home movies and basement band 
recordings”434 will spawn over the Internet to provide new and original materials that the 
public may have access to. This is particularly so within the sound recording industry as 
independent recording artists make their works available over the Internet to their 
listeners. It is submitted that as an increasing number of independent artists and authors 
begin to make their works available to the public through the Internet, users will begin to 
use these works in ways that may not be anticipated nor authorized by the artist or author. 
The principles within copyright law will be instrumental in achieving a fair balance 
between protecting artists and authors as well as allowing users to use the work for 
personal or transformative purposes. 
Conclusion
This paper had attempted to shed some light on the present copyright debates that 
surround the advent of the Internet and the effect that these new technologies have on the 
flow of information within the creative content industries. Sound recordings are 
particularly susceptible to the mass reproduction and distribution that Internet 
technologies facilitate, simply because there is a wide consumer market for these creative 
products. Content owners have sought to retain control of their creative materials as 
consumers use these works in ways that were not envisaged let alone authorized by 
copyright owners. The Internet and digital technologies have caused fundamental 
changes to the way content industries had traditionally been able to commercialize their 
works and as these technologies provide consumers unprecedented access to creative 
materials, many of the industries’ existing business models and industrial structures have 
undergone some basic changes. The sound recording industry’s conventional distribution 
channels for music, for example, have changed drastically as independent music artists 
explore new ways to establish direct contact with listeners of their music without going 
through a sound recording company. The opportunities that the Internet present 
independent music artists strike at the heart of the sound recording industry and music 
artist relationships that had been at the core of the sound recording industry for decades. 
Indeed, the opportunities that the Internet brings with it are exciting. Authors and 
artists being able to establish direct relationships with their audiences and the ability of 
the Internet to connect millions of content users provide an environment in which culture 
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may thrive and grow through the mutual exchange of creative thoughts and ideas. 
Nonetheless, with all the excitement that it brings, the Internet does pose a serious 
challenge to the content industries that have so far relied on copyright protection to 
commercialize their works. The grant of property rights in creative works through 
copyright law has served a utilitarian purpose up to this time, for authors have been 
encouraged to produce creative works for the public with the expectation that the 
successful commercialization of the work will reap rewards that will make their effort in 
producing the work worthwhile. The Internet and digital technologies however, have 
altered this expectation and authors or artists, who are unable to foresee some form of 
reward for their efforts in producing creative works, expecting these works to be rapidly 
reproduced and disseminated to the public without being able to recover their cost of 
production for the work, may cease the production of creative works at the general 
public’s expense.  
While the Internet and digital technologies may have introduced fundamental 
changes to the industries’ business models and industrial structures, the industries’ 
responses to the opportunities presented by the Internet and digital technologies largely 
determine whether content may be successfully commercialized through the Internet 
today. This paper submits that the industries’ call for more extensive rights under the 
copyright regime may have a detrimental effect on the development and growth of the 
industries as the assertion of greater control over information flow in copyrighted works 
keeps the industries functioning within the exiting business models and industrial 
structures that have worked well for the industries thus far. The call for more extensive 
copyright laws effectively prevents the industries from exploring other new ways of 
commercializing content and has the long term effect of stifling industrial growth and 
development. Preventing the use of the VCR by home users as an infringement of 
copyright law, for example, would have prevented the growth of a home video market for 
the motion pictures industry. The development of new business models for 
commercializing motion pictures and sound recordings over the Internet ensures that the 
industries continue to grow and develop in tandem with the introduction of technologies 
into the market place. 
The successful commercialization of motion pictures and sound recordings 
through the Internet today ultimately depends on the industries’ responses to the 
expectations of the consumer of their works. With the Internet presenting consumers of 
creative works opportunities to use these works in new and unprecedented ways, such as 
sharing the work with others through peer-to-peer networks or modifying the work for 
transformative purposes using digital technologies, the role of the content industries will 
evolve from being content providers to being service providers to consumers, who access 
creative materials through the Internet. As consumers are more actively involved in 
choosing the manner in which they use content today, content providers are also more 
likely to be able to successfully segregate their markets to meet these different needs and 
expectations of the consumer. Through industrial practices, such as price discrimination, 
the industries may commercialize their content in accordance to the different expectations 
and needs of their consumers and generate revenues to reap the rewards of their creative 
efforts through the segregation of different consumer markets over the Internet. The 
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commercialization of creative works over the Internet also allows the industries to 
develop a market for a particular genre of content that more conventional publishing and 
distribution channels do not carry. Independent music that represents a mix of different 
styles of musical expression, for example, may not be carried by record labels but may 
successfully find its place among independent music lovers over the Internet.             
The technological change brought about by the Internet and digital media 
technologies has also caused a fundamental shift in the industrial structure of the content 
industries as artists and authors find their own place in the commercialization of content 
through the Internet. Online exhibition of independent motion pictures is a real possibility 
today and independent music artists have started to distribute music through the Internet 
without a sound recording company to provide the support that it traditionally provided 
sound recording artists. Authors and artists are finding new ways to market and distribute 
their content through the Internet and traditional intermediaries, such as motion picture 
studios and sound recording companies, which had played a central role within the 
industries commercialization of creative works in bringing these works to the consumer, 
have a lesser role in providing the channel between content production and content 
distribution. As more authors and artists make their works available through the Internet, 
users will have greater access to creative works for transformative and creative uses. It is 
likely that there will be persistent calls for stronger copyright protection although it will 
be authors and artists, rather than the industries, who will seek greater copyright 
protection. As content users use works for transformative purposes, especially with 
digital technologies that make modifications and alterations of existing works as simple 
as a few clicks of a button on a computer, there will very likely be calls for moral rights 
protection to protect the integrity of authors and their works of authorship. While the 
United States have yet to recognize moral rights as that recognized in civil law countries, 
such as France and Germany, American law makers may be faced with calls for the 
recognition of moral rights of authors to protect their integrity as their works of 
authorship are being modified and altered over the Internet.             
The issue at the heart of the debates that surround copyright law in the digital age 
is really the extent of private rights against the public domain, for while property rights in 
creative works ensure that copyright owners have the exclusive rights in the work for its 
successful commercialization, these rights also entitle copyright owners to deny the 
public uses of the work. Claims to exclusivity of content by copyright owners in an age 
where information and creative works flow freely through the Internet have caused public 
interest groups, defending the rights of the public to creative content for general societal 
and cultural growth, to arise. There have been movements to limit property rights of 
content owners to ensure that creative works fall within the public domain, such as the 
constitutional challenge made to the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act’s extension of 
the period of copyright protection for new and existing works by twenty years in Eldred 
v. Ashcroft.435 These movements have brought an increased awareness of the need for 
copyright law to address the balance between property rights and public interests that the 
Internet has indeed affected in a profound manner. Technologies such as file sharing 
software and peer-to-peer networks, allowing the easy transfer of content between users 
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over the Internet, have allowed content users to participate fully in the distribution of 
content to the general public, shifting the onus of content distribution from content 
owners to users. As the cost of reproduction of content approaches near zero, users of 
content will inevitably begin to invest in reproduction, modification and alteration of 
content, heightening the urgency for greater and stronger copyright protection for content 
owners. The call for greater copyright protection by the industries however, expands the 
law into aspects of commerce that the law was neither intended nor drafted to address. 
Changing industrial trends brought about by new technologies ought to be addressed 
through new industrial and business practices. While the law may provide a comforting 
solution to the changes brought about the Internet through the protection of existing 
business models and industrial practices, the law is not equipped to provide the industries 
with a panacea for the fundamental changes that a technology as permeating as the 
Internet has introduced to the content market place. 
Copyright law was formally enacted in 1710 in the Statute of Anne to serve a 
noble purpose, which was to encourage learning by providing a temporary property right 
in creative works to the author so that authors may be encouraged to produce creative 
works for the public. The United States Constitution echoes the same purpose for 
copyright protection, which is to grant authors an exclusive right in their works for the 
ultimate intention of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts. Copyright 
owners have sought to extend these rights as and when technological change occurs and 
the law has stretched itself to cover new uses of works through new technologies until the 
advent of the Internet and accompanying digital technologies, when it has slowly become 
apparent that the role of the law in addressing changing industrial and business trends is a 
limited one. Indeed, the law may recognize a property right in creative works to provide 
authors with incentives to produce new works. It is however, erroneous to build industrial 
practices and business models upon a law that developed as a result of a new technology 
and which is uniquely entwined with technological development throughout its history. 
Technological development will always have an impact on copyright law and the subject 
matter of its protection, creative works, causing a shift in the balance that the law has 
always sought to draw between private rights and public interest. As the Internet causes 
fundamental changes within the industries, the law’s response to these changes would be 
to identify a new balance between private property rights and the rights of the public to 
access these works. The law is perfectly poised at this point to identify a fair balance to 
ensure that creative works are made accessible to the public by the grant of a limited 
property right in the work.  
At the end of the day, the most important question that copyright law may provide 
an answer to is whether the public as a whole will develop and grow through the grant of 
temporary property rights to authors in creative works. As use of the Internet grows, the 
central role for copyright law would be to ensure that a market for copyrighted materials 
exists through the grant of property rights to authors to enable them to commercialize 
their works. The law bears a responsibility to recognize that a thriving content market is 
built upon the ability of consumers to use creative works for the purposes they were 
intended for, which is learning, development, education and cultural growth. The 
enforcement of strict property rights will defeat the very purpose of generating creative 
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works. There is a need for the law to achieve a balance between private rights of the 
authors and the public interest by setting a clear demarcation as to where private rights 
ought to end and where public rights to access begin. Upon achieving this balance, 
copyright law today may then be said to have fulfilled the historical and constitutional 
purpose for which it was enacted.         
